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Executive Summary 
 
A synopsis of experience from the fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft communities in 
handling qualities development and the use of the Cooper-Harper pilot rating scale is 
presented as background for spacecraft handling qualities research, development, test, 
and evaluation (RDT&E).  In addition, handling qualities experiences and lessons-learned 
from previous United States (US) spacecraft developments are reviewed.  This report is 
intended to provide a central location for references, best practices, and lessons-learned to 
guide current and future spacecraft handling qualities RDT&E. 
Handling qualities embody “those qualities or characteristics of an aircraft that govern the 
ease and precision with which a pilot is able to perform the tasks required in support of 
an aircraft role" (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  These same qualities are as critical, if not 
more so, in the operation of spacecraft.   
Handling qualities include more than just the flight control system and dynamic response 
characteristics of a spacecraft or aircraft.  Handling qualities are characteristic of the 
coupled pilot-aircraft/spacecraft dynamic system which acts as a system in the 
accomplishment of a mission or task.  Handling qualities therefore also depend upon the 
pilot-vehicle interface (controls and displays), the aural, visual, and motion cues involved 
in the required operation or task, and any stress due to the task or mission and potential 
external disturbances to the vehicle.   
 
Handling qualities are assessed using the Cooper-Harper Rating scale.  This scale has 
been the internationally accepted standard for the past 40 years.  The Cooper-Harper pilot 
rating provides a shorthand notation summarizing the results of a piloted evaluation.  The 
rating is subjective yet, due to the structure of the scale and by appropriate execution of 
the test, training, and its protocol, it quantifies the vehicle’s handling characteristics for a 
given task.  This rating and the associated pilot comments and quantitative task 
performance data define the vehicles’ handling qualities.   
 
Best practices and lessons-learned are provided in two areas:  
1)  the design and execution of handling qualities simulation and flight test 
evaluations (Section 3.2); and,  
2)  the overall design and development of an aircraft (or spacecraft’s) handling 
qualities (Section 3.3).  
The best practices for the design and execution of handling qualities assessments largely 
follow the original basis established by Cooper and Harper in 1969, with amplification 
and instantiation from the works of the last 40 years.  The design and definition of 
appropriate tasks to be flown and evaluated cannot be over-emphasized.  Lessons-learned 
are given to improve the diagnostic results of, and reduce the variability in, the flying 
qualities evaluations by combinations of training, test structure, and test protocol. 
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For the overall design and development of a spacecraft’s handling qualities, history has 
shown that when a vehicle designer considers handling qualities up-front and as an 
integral, critical part of the program, significantly less time and money are spent overall 
on handling qualities development than a comparable program where this up-front 
emphasis did not occur.   
Best-practices for handling qualities suggest that a closed-loop design process should be 
used.  The process is driven by design and mission requirements.  Piloted simulation 
evaluations are the critical component used in the feedback loop, to assess and guide the 
design process.  Increasing levels of sophistication, both in the model and in the 
simulation fidelity, should be used in this process and the resultant data must be weighed 
and assessed using off-line criteria and analyses.   
Lessons-learned from aircraft developments suggest critical elements in ensuring 
excellent vehicle handling qualities and an efficient process by which to achieve them.  
These lessons-learned are simple in concept, but not always easy to put into effect by the 
vehicle management team.  An overarching lesson-learned from the aircraft handling 
qualities history is that “more flight control system problems are caused by human 
behavior than for technical reasons.”  These lessons-learned are: 
 
1. Understand the operational requirements and the piloting task in each phase of 
the mission.  Ensure good communications with pilots is maintained in order 
to be fully aware of operational conditions. 
2. Avoid over-complexity and aim to keep the flight control system design as 
simple and as visible as possible.  
3. Beware of control systems which appear to achieve excellent performance, 
mainly by open-loop compensation of the nominal model.  Such performance 
can deteriorate very rapidly when modeling tolerances are introduced or when 
external disturbances are applied.  Such effects can be corrected by improving 
the closed-loop performance of the system, usually by increasing the feedback 
gains – although this is not always possible. 
4. Plan for an integrated simulation program and ensure that all team- members 
(especially pilots and managers) are clear that the various simulators are for 
evaluation purposes, to feed data back into the analytical design process. 
5. Identify the limitations of the simulation, including consideration of providing 
motion cues.  Be aware that although simulators are of great value if used 
correctly, they can give misleading results if the assessments are not 
rigorously controlled.  Simulation validation is highly desirable, if not 
essential. 
6. Use the piloted simulator to complement the off-line design and development 
tools, and to intercept any design deficiencies at an early stage. The earlier 
problems are detected, the less it costs to fix them. 
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7. Use common code and data for off-line and piloted simulation to avoid 
unnecessary software maintenance or translation (time and cost) and the 
possible introduction of errors in control law functionality.  Provide adequate 
off-line check cases to verify the control law implementation on the simulator. 
8. Simulation displays and controls need to be representative, in order to avoid 
coloring pilot opinion of the control laws. 
9. It is desirable that pilots are ‘calibrated’ in the use of development simulators, 
to aid their judgment of the simulated aircraft’s handling characteristics.  One 
way of achieving such calibration is to allow them to familiarize themselves 
with the simulator, by flying an aircraft with which they have flying 
experience. 
10. Deliberately search for handling problems, including the effects of design 
tolerances (parameter uncertainties) and failures.  Identify the worst cases and 
any hidden weaknesses in the design, and fully explain any unexpected 
simulation results. 
11. Evaluate the ability of the pilot to enter the control loop, to help out the 
automatic functions.  Show that there is no tendency for divergence between 
the automatic and manual control functions. 
12. An Integrated Product Team for flight controls/flying qualities should be 
formed, covering all the skill areas required to develop a flight control system. 
This team should be responsible for tracking the design, development, and test 
of each component, and the implementation and verification of each interface. 
13. Deliberations should be encouraged, to bring into public view any problem or 
area of concern, so that all attendees can assess possible interactions with their 
area of responsibility, or where appropriate, potential solutions to “system” 
problems which may involve components other than those which encountered 
the anomaly.  Including all components and interfaces in the discussions 
should be stressed, since a system problem can be generated by a component 
that is performing well within the performance boundaries specified for it as a 
unit. 
Of these lessons-learned, the one that creates the most programmatic consternation is 
Number 10 – to deliberately search for handling problems.  This process is typically cited 
as one of the greatest failings for a program.  The reason is that it is counter-intuitive to 
management.  Instead of the team working to build a good vehicle, it would seem this 
step is trying to find reasons for failure.  In fact, it is just the opposite.  By diligently 
searching for problems, including the effects of design tolerances (i.e., parametric 
uncertainties) and failures, testing worst case scenarios and searching for hidden 
weaknesses, the team is proactively heading off problems that might otherwise emerge 
late in the design.  This period of “exploration and discovery” must be conducted.  If 
properly done, this work makes the subsequent test and verification phase a “non-event.”   
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Future spacecraft are anticipated to be highly automated, if not, autonomous.  Human-
automation interface requirements are not often thought of as being part of “manual 
control” handling qualities requirements, but they should be.  Although a control task 
may be automated, history has shown that the best automation designs are “human-
centered.”  A human-centered automation design takes advantage of the fact that the 
world’s best adaptive controller – the pilot – can intervene, adapt, and overcome as 
necessary in the event that the automation is not successful.   
 
Aeronautics-domain research and development history with automation has shown that 
human-automation interface requirements should be developed and evaluated in parallel 
and in concert with the vehicle’s handling qualities.  “Human-centered” automation 
designs principles are many and varied but should be adhered to in the design process. 
 
The “handling qualities” of automated tasks (i.e., human-automation interface 
requirements) should be evaluated in three ways: 
1) Pilots should conduct handling qualities of all tasks to be flown by the 
automation.  By conducting these evaluations, the pilot gains an appreciation 
of what the automation must do to successfully control the vehicle.  This 
knowledge is critical for understanding the behavior of the automation and 
what the pilot must do in the event (likely or unlikely) that they need or want 
to intervene or take-over.  This task also defines what information (e.g., out-
the-window visual cues or displays) are needed by the human to monitor, 
control, or interact with the automation. 
2) Classic “handling qualities” evaluations must also be conducted in scenarios 
where, during the conduct of automated tasks, the pilot takes control of the 
vehicle and completes the task or temporarily takes-over and then re-engages 
the automation.  This task evaluates the ability of the crew to take-over for, or 
to intervene with, the automation and the potential for upsets or discontinuities 
in the automation during this process.     
3) Finally, “handling qualities” evaluations must also be conducted in scenarios 
where, during the conduct of automated tasks, the automation fails (passively 
or actively) and the pilot must take control of the vehicle and complete the 
task.  
Historical evidence has shown that a design which provides excellent handling qualities 
enables four key benefits: 
1. Task performance which meets the mission requirements both in terms of 
precision and accuracy, with tolerable pilot workload. 
2. A more robust vehicle system, elastic to changes in task, stressors, and 
external disturbances, including pilot distraction.   
  5 
 
3. Less sensitivity to pilot technique and hence, lower training costs. 
4. Less risk in the design and higher safety margins in the operation of the 
vehicle.   
Although these historical lessons-learned are predominately aeronautics-domain based, 
US spacecraft developments (Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle) have shown similar 
experiences, thus demonstrating that these lessons-learned are directly applicable.  This 
work provides a basis from which to avoid the construct that “those that cannot remember 
the past are condemned to re-live it.” 
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1. Introduction 
In the following, a synopsis of experience from the fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft 
communities in handling qualities development and the use of the Cooper-Harper pilot 
rating scale is presented as background for spacecraft handling qualities research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).  In addition, an overview of handling 
qualities experiences and lessons-learned from previous United States (US) spacecraft 
developments are also reviewed.  These data are not nearly as plentiful as the aircraft data 
(for obvious reasons) but are offered as insight for the future spacecraft programs.   
This report is not intended to be a comprehensive, “one-stop” location for all data but 
rather, provides a central location for best practices and important lessons-learned to be 
used as “take-aways” for the spacecraft RDT&E.  References are given for those that 
desire additional information behind these data.  
2. Background 
Handling qualities embody “those qualities or characteristics of an aircraft that govern the 
ease and precision with which a pilot is able to perform the tasks required in support of 
an aircraft role"  (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  These same qualities are as critical, if not 
more so, in the operation of spacecraft.   
In the following, background of what “handling qualities” encompass and the use of the 
Cooper-Harper pilot rating scale for the assessment of handling qualities are reviewed.  
This review is extracted verbatim in many instances from the background information 
provided in the original Cooper-Harper report (NASA TN D-5153) and their Wright 
Brothers lecture paper written in 1984 to emphasize that many of the handling qualities 
issues being discussed within the current US spacecraft development programs are not 
new or novel.  However, this work also emphasizes the criticality of developing good 
handling qualities and the methods by which to do so.  This work must be based on 
understanding the historical lessons-learned, rather than re-living the unfortunate 
consequences of those that did not heed these lessons.   
2.1. Pilot-Vehicle Dynamic System 
The term "handling qualities" includes more than just the flight control system and 
dynamic response characteristics of a spacecraft or aircraft.  Handling qualities are a 
characteristic of the combined performance of the pilot and aircraft dynamic system 
acting together as a system in the accomplishment of a task.   
The concept of the “pilot-vehicle dynamic system,” shown in Figure 1, illustrates this 
concept of handling qualities where the elements of this combined system form a closed-
loop system, driven by a piloting task or objective.  Handling qualities reflect the 
precision that the pilot can accomplish the task as the controller of the closed-loop system 
and the associated pilot workload and compensation to meet this level of performance.  
The diagram shows that the “augmented aircraft” – that is, the vehicle’s dynamic 
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response characteristics augmented by its flight control system – is the primary 
determinant of handling qualities, but other factors also influence the resultant handling 
qualities, including the cockpit interface (e.g., displays (visual cues), the presence or 
absence of motion cues, the controllers (cockpit feel system)), the environment (e.g., 
external visibility, control upsets, aural cues) and pilot stressors.   
The pilot’s role as delineated in Figure 1 is to serve as “the decision-maker of what is to 
be done, the comparator of what’s happening vs. what he wants to happen, and the 
supplier of corrective inputs to the aircraft controls to achieve what he desires” (Harper 
and Cooper, 1984).  Modifications or changes in the elements within this closed-loop 
system may be compensated for by the pilot, but possibly at a cost of pilot workload or 
changes in task performance.  These effects cannot be segregated; thus, handling qualities 
must really be evaluated in the aggregate (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  Historical data can 
provide perspective and estimates on the effects of changing elements within the system 
– for example, the effect of increasing the breakout force on a pitch controller – but the 
only truly accurate measure is to evaluate the aggregate closed-loop system.   
Pilot
Aural
Cues
Task
Stress
Visual
Cues
Motion
Cues
Control
Force Cockpit
Feel
System
Control
Command Augmented
Aircraft
Aircraft
Response
External Disturbances -
Turbulence
Wind / X-Wind
Pilot-Vehicle Dynamic System
 
Figure 1: Pilot-Vehicle Dynamic System 
Since, by definition, simulation entails approximations for some or most of these 
elements within the pilot-vehicle dynamic system, the resultant handling qualities 
evaluations will be deficient in this regard.  The magnitude and consequence of these 
deficiencies would ideally be assessed or quantified somehow (e.g., Brandon et al, 1995; 
Fields et al, 2003) so that the simulation evaluations can be related to the actual vehicle in 
flight.   
2.2. Cooper-Harper Rating Scale 
To the consternation of program managers and sometimes, engineers, what was true in 
1969 is still true today: “pilot evaluation still remains the only method of assessing the 
interactions between pilot-vehicle performance and total workload in determining 
suitability of an airplane for the mission” (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  In response to this 
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challenge, Cooper and Harper laid out a systematic method for the assessment and 
evaluation of handling qualities.  The processes and definitions establish a common basis 
to achieve reliable and comparable data among pilots.  In Section 3, the lessons-learned 
in conducting piloted handling qualities evaluations are reviewed to provide insight into 
how this process should be conducted to achieve reliable and comparable data. 
Overwhelmingly, the focus of handling qualities has centered on the Cooper-Harper 
rating scale itself (Figure 2).  As noted in Harper and Cooper, 1984: “The use of one 
scale since 1969 has been of considerable benefit to engineers, and it has generally found 
international acceptance.  One problem has been that the background guidance contained 
in Cooper and Harper has not received the attention that has been given to the scale.”  For 
a subjective rating scale to produce reliable and comparable data, two things are critical: 
• First, the terminology used within the scale must be defined and understood 
by all persons (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  The original scale that was 
distributed was a two-sided scale.  The second side (shown in Figure 2) 
included the definitions to be used while using the scale.  This “B-side,” as 
noted by Harper and Cooper, has been lost over the years.    
• Second, a pilot rating will be meaningful only in proportion to the care taken 
in developing the program; that is, “in defining objectives, the role and 
mission, the evaluation task, what the rating applies to, the simulation 
situation and extent of pilot extrapolation involved.”  “Large disagreement 
between pilot ratings is usually traced to incomplete program development.” 
Cooper and Harper, 1969 
What also has been lost over the years is that the Cooper-Harper rating is not an end to 
itself, but a means to the end.  The rating itself is an expedient – a shorthand notation to 
summarize the pilot’s evaluation.  The pilot commentary data represent the more 
important result, capturing the “true” handling qualities data.  
2.3. Ordinal vs. Interval Scale 
The Cooper-Harper Rating scale is an expedient – providing a shorthand notation – 
summarizing the results of the piloted evaluation.  The critical data are the accompanying 
pilot comments and the engineering analysis and description of the mission, task, and 
simulation/flight environment under which the evaluation was conducted. 
As part of the “expedient” representation, the term handling qualities “levels” are often 
used where: 
• Level 1 denotes handling qualities that are satisfactory without improvement - 
Cooper-Harper ratings between 1 and 3; 
• Level 2 denotes handling qualities which exhibit deficiencies that warrant 
improvement - Cooper-Harper ratings between 4 and 6; and,  
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• Level 3 denotes handling qualities which exhibit deficiencies that require 
improvement - Cooper-Harper ratings between 7 and 9.   
 
Deficiencies
warrant
improvement
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Yes
Yes
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No
No
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Deficiencies
require
improvement
Is it
satisfactory without
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Is adequate
performance
attainable with a tolerable
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it controllable?
Improvement
mandatory
Good
Negligible deficiencies
Fair - Some mildly
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Highly desirable
Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance
Minimal pilot compensation required
for desired performance 
Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance
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deficiencies
Very objectionable but
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Minor but annoying
deficiencies
Adequate performance requires
considerable pilot compensation
Adequate performance requires
extensive pilot compensation 
Desired performance requires
moderate pilot compensation
Major Deficiencies
Major Deficiencies
Major Deficiencies
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to retain control 
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and/or subphases with accompanying conditions.
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COOPER-HARPER HANDLING QUALITIES RATING SCALE
 
COMPENSATION
The measure of additional pilot effort
and attention required to maintain a
given level of performance in the face
of deficient vehicle characteristics.
Those qualities or charcteristics of an
aircraft that govern the ease and pre-
cision with which a pilot is able to
perform the tasks required in support
of an aircraft role.
HANDLING QUALITIES
MISSION
The composite of pilot-vehicle functions
that must be performed to fulfil opera-
tional requirements.  May be specified for
a role, complete flight, flight phase, or
flight subphase.
PERFORMANCE
The precision of control with respect to
aircraft movement that a pilot is able to
achieve in performing a task.  (Pilot
vehicle performance is a measure of
handling performance.  Pilot perform-
ance is a measure of the manner or
efficiency with which a pilot moves the
principal controls  in performing a task.)
The function or purpose that defines the
primary use of an aircraft.
The actual work assigned a pilot to be
performed in completion of or as repre-
sentative of a designated flight segment.
The integrated physical and mental effort
required to perform a specified piloting task.
ROLE
TASK
WORKLOAD
DEFINITIONS FROM TN-D-5153
(BACK)
Cooper-Harper     Ref. NASA TND-5153
 
Figure 2:  Front and Back of Cooper-Harper Pilot Rating Scale 
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As stated by Cooper and Harper, “an interval scale is desirable, but the proposed pilot 
rating scale cannot be shown to be an interval scale.  The authors have accepted it as 
being ordinal.”  Cooper and Harper were originally reluctant to associate numerals to 
handling qualities ratings with this ordinal scale since “engineers will attempt to treat the 
pilot rating data with mathematical operations that are rigorously applicable only to a 
linear interval scale” (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  This, indeed, has happened on 
numerous occasions, whereby, for instance, McDonnell (1968) attempted to show an 
underlying interval scale (and an associated attempt at creating “conversions” between 
the two scales).  This concept was reinvestigated in Mitchell and Aponso, 1990.  Further 
instantiations have attempted to associate the ordinal Cooper-Harper scale ratings to the 
probability of loss-of-control (Hodgkinson, 1995).  This latter work is intuitive and 
insightful but it mathematically takes liberties on the ordinal properties of the Cooper-
Harper scale.   
As a general rule, “although some insight is sometimes gained, analysis of specific pilot 
rating data should not be totally dependent on such mathematical operations” (Cooper 
and Harper, 1969).  In the response to McDonnell’s IEEE journal article on his work 
(McDonnell, 1969), George Cooper responded that “The final Cooper-Harper scale is not 
claimed to be an interval scale as recommended by Mr. McDonnell.  Furthermore, it is 
not clearly evident that this is an essential requirement.  In fact, the main argument 
advanced for an interval scale is that it permits mathematical manipulation of pilot 
ratings, i.e., averaging etc.  We are in fact concerned about indiscriminant attempts to 
perform such manipulations and would recommend careful examination of the 
supplementary pilot comments that accompany the pilot rating data and the determination 
of reasons for significant differences in rating by different pilots.”   
As discussed in their recommendations (Cooper and Harper, 1969), each rating and the 
accompanying pilot comment and task data must be carefully considered in the 
assessment of handling qualities.  The use of mathematical manipulations should be 
cautiously considered.  If pursued, only analytical tools appropriate to ordinal data (and 
also typically, small sample sizes) should be used (e.g., see Dukes, 1985).  Some 
analytical work, such as associating an increased probability of loss-of-control to poor 
flying qualities (Hodgkinson et al, 1992), is intuitively obvious and warrants merit as it 
highlights the importance of handling qualities to managers and engineers in the design 
process.  But statistical rigor to mathematically prove this association and others is often 
difficult due to the ordinal nature of the scale and the small sample sizes from most 
experiments.   
Another point that often needs to be considered in pilot evaluations is that the Cooper-
Harper scale is an absolute scale rather than a relative one.  “The pilot rating is given for 
a configuration in the context of its acceptability to the pilot for the specified flight phase 
(or task) and not in terms of its goodness with respect to a configuration already 
evaluated” (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  Nonetheless, this issue continually creeps into 
the use of Cooper-Harper ratings, particularly as it affects the use of a Cooper-Harper 
rating of 1: “Pilots are reluctant to rate something as excellent or optimum for fear that a 
subsequent configuration will be better than anything they considered possible” (Cooper 
and Harper, 1969).  This issue should be addressed in the pilot briefing and training 
  11 
 
process (as detailed in Section 3) whereby pilots are encouraged to use the entire scale 
and that a rating of 1 does not mean optimal – it means that the aircraft characteristics are 
“excellent, highly desirable” and that “pilot compensation is not a factor in achieving 
desired performance.”  More than one configuration in the world can exhibit 
characteristics meriting ratings of 1.   
2.4. Pilot Commentary 
Pilot ratings, without the comments, are only part of the flying qualities story.  (Cooper 
and Harper, 1969).  The comments reflect the “real data” which supplements the short-
hand expedient rating.   
Pilots should be encouraged to provide specific comments, using a comment card 
developed for the test, to serve as a “checklist” to tease out specific comments of interest 
for the engineers.  An example pilot comment card from a recent Spacecraft Handling 
Qualities proximity operations and docking test is shown in Figure 3.  
Experience has firmly cemented the fact that if the handling qualities are good, the pilot 
comments are short and sweet.  On the other hand, pilot comments, when there are 
handling qualities deficiencies, are usually quite long and elaborate.  In any event, the 
pilots should be briefed to follow the comment card, be concise yet comprehensive in 
describing the observed handling qualities characteristics while not trying to engineer a 
fix or hypothesize solutions in real-time.  (Fixes and solutions are evaluated and created 
ideally using a slightly different process as discussed in Section 3.)   
Pilot comments are critical for two reasons: 
1)  “to the airplane designer who is responsible for improving the handling 
qualities and to the engineer who is attempting to understand and use the pilot 
rating data.”  (Cooper and Harper, 1969) 
2)  as “a means of assessing whether his objections (which lead to his summary 
rating) were related to the mission, to some extraneous factor in the execution 
of the experiment, or to his inaccurate interpretation of various aspects of the 
mission.”  (Cooper and Harper, 1969) 
In essence, the commentary provides the basis by which to fix a design (if necessary), use 
the data, or identify if the test is measuring something unintended or unexpected by the 
testers.  Without these data, the Cooper-Harper ratings can be misleading or irrelevant to 
these intended purposes.   
2.5. Subjective and Objective Task Data  
The three critical handling qualities elements for a given task are the resultant 
performance, pilot workload, and pilot compensation.  Again, to the consternation of 
engineers, in particular, “pilot evaluation still remains the only method of assessing the 
interactions between pilot-vehicle performance and total workload in determining 
suitability of an airplane for the mission.”  “Pilot evaluation is like most forms of 
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experimental data … since it is a subjective output of the human, it can be affected by 
factors not normally monitored by engineers.”  (Harper & Cooper, 1984).  Best practices 
show that the design of the experiment and protocol is critical – as discussed in Section 3 
– and that subjective and objective data should be obtained to provide insight and 
diagnosticity into the handling qualities evaluations and the rating processes. 
 
Figure 3:  Example Pilot Comment Card 
The inherent subjective nature of handling qualities hasn’t stopped engineers from trying 
to quantify handling qualities or remove the “uncontrollable” pilot-subjective element 
from the process of determining handling qualities.  The techniques have ranged from 
cockpit-based expert systems (Gungras et al, 1996) to automated rating techniques using 
physiological data (Suchomel, 1996) and fuzzy-logic (Tseng, Guptat, and Schumann, 
2006).  
As discussed in Section 3, the definition of the mission, the task, and the desired and 
adequate performance standards are critical to the handling qualities evaluation process.  
Obviously, this task performance should be measured.  The measured task performance, 
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not only provides quantitative measure of the pilot-vehicle system performance, but 
provides for diagnosis as to whether the cause or effect for any handling qualities 
deficiencies were induced by performance.  One limitation however, is that these 
measures do not typically quantify “control” per se.  Although concepts attempting to 
identify pilot-induced oscillations – a form of loss-of-control – from time history data 
have been tried (Elliott, 2007; Mitchell et al, 2005; Fabre and Raimbault, 2001), the 
reliability of these methods and their correspondence to the handling qualities processes 
have not been verified and validated. 
Additional diagnostic insight is provided by workload measures.  The NASA Task Load 
Index (TLX) is ideal for this task since its multi-dimensional aspects provide insight into 
the sources of workload and hence, specific influences on handling qualities (Figure 4).  
The only drawback to TLX is that to develop a highly reliable workload measure for each 
pilot, a paired-comparison between the TLX workload dimensions should be conducted 
to develop weighting factors for subsequent computation of an overall workload score 
(Hart and Staveland 1988).  Fortunately, others have shown that the paired-comparison 
weighting determinations are not necessary, as a simple averaging results in no loss of 
accuracy (e.g., see Moroney, Biers, Eggemeier, and Mitchell, 1992).   
The TLX and other scales like it reflect subjective pilot workload.  Objective measures of 
workload, such as physiological indices have also been attempted and, with some 
success, provide quantitative measures (Martin, G.F., and Eggemeier, 1991).  One 
intuitively obvious measure, pilot control activity, is continually attempted but has been 
found to be an inherently flawed measure of pilot workload.  The control activity 
measures are confounded by pilot strategy, training, and experience as well as the fact 
that these measures are task-specific (Gawron, 2000).   
For example, one would intuitively expect that as the handling qualities degrade that pilot 
workload would increase and increasing control activity would be an indicator of this 
trend.  First, at a minimum, control activity may only be related to physical work.  It is 
certainly not associated with mental or other dimensional aspects of pilot workload.  In 
the Cooper-Harper rating process, pilot workload is the “integrated physical and mental 
effort” required to complete the task.  Second, as handling qualities degrade, different 
control strategies may be employed by the pilot.  For instance, as control system delay 
increases, pilots typically reduce their “gain” to avoid large control inputs which may 
induce adverse coupling with the vehicle (Bailey et al, 1987).  Because the control 
activity would be decreasing, pilot control activity metrics would suggest improved 
flying qualities; whereas, the subjective handling qualities ratings would reflect degraded 
handling qualities due to increased pilot compensation, increased mental workload, and 
degraded task performance and control.  Lastly, control activity is an individualistic 
quantity, influenced by experience and training, which changes from task to task.  The 
same task, in different environmental conditions (e.g., winds and turbulence) will 
necessitate different control activity to achieve the same performance.  Numerous other 
disassociations like these have been found (e.g., Schultz et al, 1970).  As such, subjective 
measures, while not ideal, are indicative of the flying qualities rating process.  
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The last “ingredient” – compensation – is even less amenable to objective data analysis 
than the others.  Compensation is defined as “the measure of additional pilot effort and 
attention required to maintain a given level of performance in the face of deficient vehicle 
characteristics.”   The variables of training and experience again play a significant role in 
the assessment of control compensation.   
Some closed-loop handling qualities criteria (closed-loop in the sense that they include a 
pilot model in their formulation) offer a sense of how control compensation plays a role 
in handling qualities (e.g., Neal and Smith, 1974 and Bailey and Bidlack, 1995), but 
objective and subjective measures for control compensation are neither readily available 
nor either validated or verified for handling qualities evaluations.     
The subjective nature of handling qualities evaluations has fostered numerous endeavors 
to eliminate or reduce the subjectivity of pilot evaluations in defining handling qualities.  
While these intentions are good, the key isn’t so much eliminating the pilot as an 
evaluator, but precisely designing the test, conducting adequate training, and performing 
structured evaluations, as detailed in the following, to minimize the variability in the 
resultant evaluations.  The test results which result from this procedure will accurately 
reflect the vehicle handling qualities – for better or worse.   
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Rating Scale Definitions 
 
Title Descriptions 
MENTAL DEMAND 
 
How much mental and perceptual activity 
was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, 
calculating, remembering, looking, 
searching, etc.)?  Was the task easy or 
demanding, simple or complex, exacting 
or forgiving? 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
 
How much physical activity was required 
(e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, 
controlling, activating, etc.)?  Was the 
task easy or demanding, slow or brisk, 
slack or strenuous, restful or laborious? 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
 
How much time pressure did you feel 
due to the rate or pace at which the tasks 
or task elements occurred?  Was the 
pace slow and leisurely or rapid and 
frantic? 
PERFORMANCE 
 
How successful do you think you were in 
accomplishing the goals of the task set 
by the experimenter (or yourself)?  How 
satisfied were you with your performance 
in accomplishing these goals? 
EFFORT 
 
How hard did you have to work (mentally 
and physically) to accomplish your level 
of performance? 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL 
 
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, 
stressed and annoyed versus secure, 
gratified, content, relaxed and 
complacent did you feel during the task? 
Figure 4:  TLX Rating Scale 
 
MENTAL DEMAND 
 
Low High 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
 
Low High 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
 
Low High 
PERFORMANCE 
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3. Handling Qualities Development 
The advent of digital computing and fly-by-wire flight control system technologies 
provided the capability whereby the handling qualities of aircraft could be tailored to the 
desires of the designer and essentially without regard of the vehicle’s aerodynamics 
(stability and control).  Despite this promise, handling qualities problems were rampant in 
these modern aircraft (National Research Council, 1997).  An overarching lesson-learned 
from this history was that “more flight control system problems are caused by human 
behavior than for technical reasons” (Hodgkinson, 1990).  These lessons-learned are 
reviewed to avoid re-living this history within the current and future US spacecraft 
development programs. 
3.1. Best Practices Process 
Fixed-wing and rotary-wing experiences in handling qualities developments are briefly 
reviewed to provide “best practices” guidance. 
These best practices are reviewed in two areas:  
1)  for the design and execution of handling qualities simulation and flight test 
evaluations (Section 3.2); and,  
2)  for the overall design and development of an aircraft (or spacecraft’s) 
handling qualities (Section 3.3).    
Finally, in Section 3.4, an overview of industry standards for test and verification of 
handling qualities for fixed-and rotary-wing vehicles is provided.  This overview is 
intended for perspective.   
It should be noted that the test and verification process (Section 3.4) should be integrally 
linked to the best practices for the design and development phase.  In fact, if a “best 
practices” approach to handling qualities is used in the aircraft (and spacecraft) design 
and development, the test and verification phase should be a “non-event.”  The flying 
qualities in test and verification should be thoroughly understood by the entire team.  Any 
flying qualities deficiencies that do result in the test and evaluation phase would be due to 
factors, uncertainties, or inaccuracies in the actual flight hardware that could not be 
accurately simulated or tested before hand.  However, these issues would have been 
identified and tracked as “risks” during the design and development phase and 
exploratory studies would have been conducted to assess the risk impacts.  Thus, the risks 
and potential mitigations would be already identified and in place. 
3.2. Cooper-Harper Experience 
In the following, the best-practices for the conduct of handling qualities test and 
evaluations are summarized.  The intent of these best practices is to: a) achieve reliable 
and comparable data among pilots; and b) provide accurate and sufficient handling 
qualities testing.  These practices emphasize evaluations conducted during the design and 
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development phase, but they are generalizable to evaluations conducted throughout the 
design, test, and evaluation cycle.   
The processes and definitions established by Cooper and Harper form the primary basis 
to achieve reliable and comparable data among pilots.  The lessons-learned in conducting 
piloted handling qualities evaluations in accordance with these processes are reviewed to 
provide insight into these processes.  New data and experience to support the work of 
Cooper and Harper are also provided. 
3.2.1. Scale Definitions 
First and foremost, the Cooper-Harper Scale depends upon precise definitions of the 
words used.  (Harper and Cooper, 1984)  The definitions – essentially the B-side of the 
Cooper-Harper scale – should be used.  These definitions should be reviewed during the 
pre-evaluation training and referenced during the course of the evaluations.   
Best-practices would suggest that a review of the definitions is conducted and discussed 
during the pre-test briefing.  Also, the same engineers/experimenters should conduct the 
pre-test briefing for each evaluation pilot to ensure that this discussion and the resulting 
interpretation of the definitions is consistent for all evaluation pilots. 
3.2.2. Scale Usage 
How to use the scale must be understood by all evaluation pilots (EPs).  While familiarity 
within the test pilot community may be assumed, the usage of the scale and the 
evaluation process should be repeated in pre-test briefings.  The amount of training 
should be based on the evaluation pilot’s familiarity and currency with the scale and the 
process to the point that all pilots are equally familiar.   
In the use of the scale, it should be emphasized that the Cooper-Harper pilot rating is a 
shorthand notation which best represents the pilot’s overall assessment of the evaluation.  
It reflects the pilot’s summary opinion as to whether the handling qualities are 
satisfactory without improvement or if there are deficiencies which warrant or require 
improvement. 
As noted by Cooper-Harper, “There tends to be some disagreement among pilots as to 
how they actually arrive at a specific numerical rating.  Some pilots lean heavily on the 
specific rating description and look for the description that best fits their overall 
assessment.  Other pilots prefer to make the dichotomous decisions sequentially, thereby 
arriving at a choice between two or three ratings.”  Experience has shown that using the 
dichotomous decision-tree reduces rating variability and provides consistency in the 
application of the scale.   
In one attempt to reduce pilot rating variability, the decision tree process was enforced by 
using an interactive computer program which only displayed the parts of the Cooper-
Harper scale – the decision tree - based upon the pilot’s answers to the decision tree 
questions (Wilson and Riley, 1989).  This feature enforced the dichotomous decision tree, 
but experienced EPs didn’t necessarily appreciate this feature since they couldn’t read the 
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entire scale to determine their rating.  Since their rating is a shorthand notation to the 
words on the scale that best described their evaluation, they could not reflect across the 
scale ratings when only part of the scale was displayed.   
For example, on one program (Monagan, Smith, and Bailey, 1981), evaluation pilots 
could achieve desired performance flying some aircraft configurations but they had 
extremely abrupt roll response dynamics to pilot control inputs.  These configurations 
presented a quandary, in that, while desired performance could be achieved, their 
handling qualities characteristics were not necessarily desirable.  The evaluation pilots 
had to adopt smooth and deliberate control actions to avoid unacceptable accelerations in 
the cockpit.  These configurations exhibited pilot ratings that were rated either 4 or 7.  
This rating difference at first seems illogical, but the evaluation comments and ratings 
were consistent and truly indicative of the aircraft’s handling qualities.  To some EPs, the 
pilot could achieve desired performance and the control compensation was only moderate 
- the deficiencies warranted improvement.  On the other hand, other pilots could achieve 
desired performance but the deficiencies were so objectionable that they required 
improvement; hence, ratings of 7 (control was not in question).  For experienced 
evaluation pilots, the whole scale should be shown and used to give ratings. 
This example obviously does not promote confidence in the repeatability and reliability 
of Cooper-Harper handling qualities data; but it does accurately reflect the closed-loop 
pilot-vehicle characteristics.  “There will always be cases where different regions of 
aircraft characteristics will maximize an individual’s performance and minimize their 
workload, due to a pilot’s experience, training, and personal “tastes.”  (e.g., see Wilson 
and Riley, 1989).  There are regions, nonetheless, that maximize performance and 
minimize workload for the vast majority of pilots.  These rating differences typically 
occur at the boundaries between good and bad handling qualities (so-called “Level 2” 
configurations) or for aircraft that exhibit nonlinear or “cliff-like” characteristics.   
Some have suggested that the scale itself has fundamental flaws, which promote pilot 
rating variability and uncertainty (Hoh, 1990; Riley and Wilson, 1990; Moorhouse, 
1990).  However, these so-called “flaws” do not out-weight the universal acceptance of 
the scale as written.  Further, these issues are inconsequential compared to the bigger 
sources of pilot rating variability.  As stated by Cooper and Harper, “precise definitions 
for the aircraft (or spacecraft) role and mission, the evaluation task, what the rating 
applies to, the simulation situation and the extent of pilot extrapolation are required.”  
(Cooper and Harper, 1969).  Without these factors being precisely defined, uncontrollable 
variability in handling qualities data will result.   
3.2.3. Definition of the “Selected Task or Required Operation” 
The Cooper-Harper scale and the pilot evaluation reflect the adequacy of the vehicles’ 
handling qualities for the “selected task or required operation.”  The selected task or 
required operations must be precisely defined.  “The explicit description of the mission 
by delineation of the "required operations" is probably the most important contributor to 
the objectivity of the pilot evaluation data.“  (Cooper and Harper, 1969). 
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The complete task is composed of (1) the control task, and (2) auxiliary tasks (Cooper 
and Harper, 1969).  “A task in the sense that it is used in handling qualities evaluations is 
defined as "the actual work assigned a pilot to be performed in completion of, or as 
representative of, a designated flight segment." (Cooper and Harper, 1969). 
The tasks should be defined by examining the actual mission context and then, with the 
existing evaluation tools, one should examine what can be done to assess that situation.  
“The tasks which the piloted airplane must perform, the weather (instrument, visual) and 
environmental conditions (day, night) which are expected to be encountered, the situation 
stressors (emergencies, upsets, combat), the disturbances (turbulence), distractions 
(secondary tasks), the sources of information available (displays, director guidance)—all 
these and more need to be considered.  Secondary piloting tasks (voice communication, 
airplane and weapon system management) as well as primary tasks should be considered 
as they affect the attention available and total pilot workload.”  (Harper & Cooper, 1984). 
“The pilot must be given a clear description and understanding reached between the 
engineer and the evaluation pilot as to their interpretation of the required operations.  
This description must include: 
a.  What the pilot is required to accomplish with the aircraft, and 
b.  The conditions or circumstances under which the mission is to be conducted.” 
Cooper and Harper, 1969 
3.2.4. Evaluation Situation/Extrapolation 
In virtually every context, simulation or flight testing is used in an attempt to understand 
or forecast the handling qualities of the actual vehicle during actual operation.  Since the 
engineer (and pilot) wants to get this assessment, there is a temptation to “extrapolate” 
the results to the “real-world.”    
As discussed by Harper and Cooper (1984), “Some would have the pilot assess only the 
simulated operation; others would have him use the simulation results to 
predict/extrapolate to the real world operation.”  The issue must be discussed and 
addressed a priori; otherwise, different pilots may produce different results.”  As a 
minimum, the idea of extrapolation needs to be agreed upon. 
For pilot rating repeatability, experience shows that “the best extrapolation is no 
extrapolation.”  If you ask the pilot to extrapolate their ratings to other situations and 
circumstances, a significant degree of variability and uncontrollability is introduced.   
However, as also discussed by Harper and Cooper (1984), “An important aspect to this 
question of extrapolation is: if the pilot doesn’t do it, who will?  And what are his 
credentials for doing so?  Some differences (especially simulator deficiencies) would 
seem to be primarily left to the engineer to unravel (perhaps with the aid of a test pilot), 
for it is difficult for the evaluation pilot to fully assess the effects, for example, for 
missing motion cues or time delays in the visual scene.  But when the simulation tasks do 
not include all of the real situation, one would perhaps rather depend upon the pilot to 
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assess what he sees in the simulator in the light of his experience in the real-world tasks.”  
(Harper & Cooper, 1984). 
Extrapolation is usually an issue when evaluating particular combinations of failure and 
operating conditions.  “Such questions of probability of occurrence and levels of 
disturbances must be resolved as part of the mission description in the design of the 
experiment, with special attention often being required with respect to pilot orientation 
and the reporting of results.” (Cooper and Harper, 1969).  Again, in the pre-brief, the 
evaluation pilot should be made aware that some combinations of failures and operating 
conditions may be more or less likely to occur.   
For pilot rating repeatability, the degree of extrapolation would be discussed and agreed 
upon – with consistency across all EPs.  The best extrapolation is no extrapolation – the 
pilot should rate the configurations and scenarios strictly in the context for which they 
were flown.  The “extrapolation” based on the probability of occurrence can be handled 
in the post-test de-brief and by engineering analysis.  In some cases, relaxed task 
performance standards have been used for contingency or low-probability of occurrence 
scenarios to reflect that the configurations might be a “last-ditch” effort to save the 
aircraft or mission.  “… “operating problems” consisting of combination of failure or 
weather conditions are apt to raise the question of probability of occurrence.  Again, this 
question should be separated from the pilot assessment wherever possible.”  (Cooper and 
Harper, 1969). 
3.2.5. Specification of Performance Standards 
In addition to explicitly defining the task or required operation, precise definitions of task 
performance standards must be established.   
These task performance standards must be: a) germane to the required operation or task 
as they apply to the actual mission; b) include variables or outcomes controllable by the 
pilot; c) observable to the pilot; and, d) sufficiently demanding that high closed-loop 
pilot-vehicle “task bandwidth” is required to aptly stress and test the handling qualities 
characteristics.   
In many cases, task performance standards naturally flow from the performance 
demanded for the actual mission.  For instance, handling qualities testing for aircraft 
landing task naturally use the touchdown point as a vital part of the performance 
standard.  The results are clearly observable to the pilot and under their control.   
On the other hand, sometimes indirect standards, germane to the mission, are necessary.  
For instance, in boom tanker refueling, the mission is to off-load fuel from the tanker to 
the receiver aircraft.  The handling qualities performance standards for the receiver in this 
task do not directly reflect the mission, but access the ability of the receiver to move into 
and then maintain the contact position.  The rest of the mission – the ability of the boom 
operator to make contact and off-load fuel – is not part of the handling qualities test.  The 
performance standards have involved using visually observable and controllable 
parameters for the pilot of the receiver aircraft (see Figure 5 from Leggett and Cord, 
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1994).  The angular position of tanker lights and markings make it possible for the pilot 
of the receiver aircraft to control and observe performance in real-time. 
 
Figure 5:  Desired and Adequate Performance During Boom Aerial Refueling  
(from Leggett and Cord, 1994)  
The term “task bandwidth” qualifies the extent that the task demands stress the pilot and 
test the closed-loop handling qualities.  Task bandwidth is determined by: 1) the precision 
that is demanded of the pilot-vehicle performance; and, 2) the time to complete the task.  
A time constraint may be naturally occurring for certain tasks.  If it is not naturally part of 
a task, it should be imposed.  For instance, in a landing task, the time constraint is 
established by the approach speed and winds.  For a refueling task, a closure rate should 
be established which dictates how quickly the vehicle must move from the pre-contact 
position into a refueling position.  Without stipulating the closure rate, pilots when flying 
aircraft with handling qualities deficiencies may stop or slow the closure so they have 
more time to keep the aircraft under control. 
Task bandwidth is also modulated by the task definition.  Introducing positional offsets in 
a task requires that the pilot null these position errors by actively entering the control 
loop.  How much time is afforded the pilot to do the task, establishes the bandwidth.  For 
instance, an offset landing task (Figure 6) is often used.  The offset landing is the nominal 
mission task, but the offset ensures that the pilot actively enters the control loop, 
requiring pitch and roll inputs, to correctly align and land the aircraft.  The idea of 
standardized task performance standards has emerged.  The concept is that, for aircraft to 
meet a particular mission, the handling qualities task performance standards should be 
invariant.  This work has taken many forms, from the Mission Task Elements which are a 
vital part of the Aeronautical Design Standard (ADS)-33, which is the tri-service rotary 
wing handling qualities standard – to the “Standard Evaluation Maneuver Set” (Leggett 
and Cord, 1994) which serves as a verification basis within MIL-HDBK-1797 - the 
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military flying qualities handbook for fixed-wing aircraft.  The Joint Strike Fighter 
program developed task performance standards for their prototype fly-off and are using 
them for the verification and validation in the production vehicle.   
Finally, the task performance standards – for completeness sake – should include a 
stipulation against undesirable characteristics so that pilot-induced oscillations (PIO), for 
example, cannot be considered “desired performance”  (see Table I as an example of the 
offset landing task performance standards).  Pilot-induced oscillations are instabilities in 
the closed-loop pilot-vehicle dynamic system, sometimes referred to as airplane-pilot 
coupling.  Explicitly stating “No PIO” within the desired performance box in Table I, 
achieves two goals: 1) it continually reminds the pilots that PIO is undesirable and they 
should be searching for its presence and its negative connotations; and, 2) it prevents 
there from being any doubt that IF a pilot were to be so lucky as to be in a PIO which just 
so happens be within the desired performance touchdown zone, that this behavior is still 
not desirable.  (In fact, it could be argued that this type of performance is not adequate 
performance either.)   
Table I: Offset Landing Task Performance Standards 
Desired Performance Desired Performance Adequate Performance 
Longitudinal Touchdown  1000 to 1500 ft past threshold 750 to 2250 ft past threshold 
Lateral Touchdown  +/- 10 ft of centerline +/- 27 ft of centerline 
Sink Rate < 4 ft per sec < 7 ft per sec 
Other No PIO  
 
Offset C orrection H eight -
200 ft  Above Ground Level
Configured for Landing
Flying Offset to Runway
300  ft Lateral Offset
Desired Touchdown 
Zone – 500 ft
 
Figure 6:  Lateral Offset Landing Task 
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3.2.6. Task Performance 
At the completion of the task, the task performance should be reported to the pilot.  This 
procedure can reduce variability in the Cooper-Harper Pilot Rating (CHPR) process; 
however, it is not necessarily eliminated.  As per the scale definitions, desired 
performance is a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition for Level 1 ratings 
(CHPRs of 1, 2 and 3).  Adequate performance is a necessary but not necessarily 
sufficient condition for Level 2 ratings (CHPRs of 5 and 6).   
Particularly during a verification and validation phase, pilot rating variability can be 
problematic.  The definition and structure of the evaluation task can be used to reduce 
structural causes for evaluation differences.   
First, the task initial conditions establish the start of the evaluation and the task 
performance standards typically dictate the outcome or “end condition.”  But task 
performance variability (and consequently, pilot rating variability) is induced by 
differences in how the evaluation pilots flies the task between these established initial and 
end-conditions.   
For instance, in evaluating landing handling qualities for fixed-wing aircraft, an offset 
landing task is often used.  The task requires the pilot to fly parallel to the nominal 
approach but laterally offset (nominally 250 ft) from the runway centerline.  Upon 
reaching a predetermined altitude above the runway, the pilot corrects the offset by 
performing a sidestep maneuver and completes the landing.  The lateral offset task forces 
the pilot to actively control the vehicle and does not allow use of “open-loop”-type 
maneuvers which wouldn’t adequately stress the aircraft’s handling characteristics.  The 
sidestep acts as a “disturbance” function.  How quickly and aggressively each pilot 
performs the side-step maneuver can significantly influence the evaluation.  Gradual 
sidestep corrections can keep flying qualities problems from appearing, whereas the same 
or a different pilot who might more quickly re-acquire the runway centerline and excite a 
“lurking” deficiency.  
For handling qualities “exploration and discovery” (see Section 3.3), structure in how to 
fly a task is not necessarily desired.  To search for lurking handling qualities problems or 
“cliffs,” the engineering team wants the pilot to explore different control techniques and 
different ways to fly a particular task.  The results of this exercise may generate pilot 
rating variability, but this type of data is invaluable in understanding a configuration. 
On the other hand, this non-uniformity may frustrate a statistically-driven design 
validation and verification process.  If ratings “conformity” is desired, all aspects of 
flying the task should be briefed and the test structured – somehow – to enforce 
uniformity in how the task is flown.  Pilot briefings should be used but a briefing alone is 
not typically sufficient.  Test methods to control how the task is to be flown are the best 
method if rating variability is to be minimized.  Pilots should be briefed what rates and 
accelerations are to be used in the task execution.   
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Second, evaluation pilots should be briefed to always strive to achieve desired 
performance and use compensation and control techniques to do so.  Using this 
philosophy promotes rating consistency.  On the other hand, if “exploration and 
discovery of a vehicle’s handling qualities” is desired, pilots may and should be 
encouraged to use different control compensation and techniques to try to desired 
performance or adequate performance, when desired performance does not appear 
achievable.  (Adequate performance is not a disaster.  Adequate performance means that 
the mission can still be completed, albeit with a slight pilot workload and/or 
compensation penalty and reduced performance margins.)  By “relaxing” the standard of 
performance to adequate, the pilot is typically relaxing how tightly they are controlling 
the vehicle.  As such, they may not excite deficient handling qualities and end up, 
possibly, with desired task performance.  Experienced evaluation pilots will recognize 
this behavior – i.e., the need to stay “out of the loop” to avoid exciting deficiencies - as 
control compensation and workload.  Their ratings and comments for this configuration 
will track this behavior.  But because the training and experience of the pilot with these 
types of configurations is critical (i.e., to recognize the compensation and their 
subconscious change in task “objective”), this behavior may contribute to inter-pilot 
rating variability if the training and experience of the evaluation pilots differ.  
Lastly, a test technique called Handling Qualities During Tracking (HQDT) was 
championed whereby the pilot attempts to eliminate any error in the performance of the 
task (Twisdale and Franklin, 1975).  The objective was to create a "stress test" of 
handling qualities.  This type of test is not truly a handling qualities test – in fact, 
adequate and desired performance standards are not supposed to be defined for HQDT 
and Cooper-Harper ratings are not recommended  (Leggett & Cord, 1994).  The HQDT 
technique demands that the pilot strive for “perfection,” using near limit-cycle inputs, 
without the pilot trying to compensate for aircraft deficiencies.  This task and striving for 
“perfection” should not be used as the driving task requirement for a true handling 
qualities evaluation.  But this type of technique may be part of the handling qualities 
“exploration” process.  If used, the fact that the HQDT is not a handling qualities test 
should be emphasized and “abusive” and unrealistic pilot inputs should be avoided. 
3.2.7. Use of Pre-Test Evaluation Pilots 
It is critical that the engineering team use a subject matter expert (SME) pilot in a pre-test 
phase to assess and develop the briefings, the tasks, and the task performance standards.   
This pilot should review and critique all aspects of the test.  The SME should explore the 
handling qualities behaviors of the planned configurations, tasks, and rating techniques 
and scales.   
This pilot should focus on the test set-up as well as providing preliminary data for the 
engineering team who are developing the test.  “It is generally recommended to use only 
a few pilots (sometimes only one) until the experiment has matured through the 
engineer’s understanding of the comment and rating data.  His task of sorting out, 
organizing, and digesting the comments and ratings to understand the pilot-airplane 
system is complex and often frustrating. By working closely with one or a few pilots 
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initially, the engineer can often acquire this understanding sooner.” (Harper & Cooper, 
1984). 
The pre-test developmental pilots, once their work is complete, should not be used in the 
“formal” data collection process. 
3.2.8. Evaluation Pilot Selection 
The first rule of thumb is that “the evaluation pilots represent the user population and 
should be experienced in the required operation” (Harper & Cooper, 1984).  Since the 
evaluations are subjective in nature, the background, training, experience, and point of 
view of the evaluation pilots must be considered in their selection based on the program 
objective as well as by the intended use of the resultant data (Cooper and Harper, 1969). 
The effects of differing skills should be determined from the results obtained from 
evaluation pilots of different, but representative, levels of experience and training. 
Exceptions to this general rule have occurred, however, when the research or 
development test pilot is asked to evaluate handling qualities with respect to his 
understanding of the lowest degree of skill and training existent in a group of operational 
pilots” (Cooper and Harper, 1969). 
3.2.9. Number of Evaluation Pilots 
Once the pre-test is completed, the number of pilots to use for the test matrix is always a 
tradeoff between pilot schedule/availability and the cost to run the simulation or flight 
test.  Ideally, you’d like the sample size to be as large as possible to obtain statistical 
significance, but this is typically impractical.  Riley and Wilson (1990) suggested a 
flowchart to determine the number of evaluation pilots required as a balance between 
quality and cost.  Practically speaking, the number of highly qualified test pilots required 
to attain statistical significance using sophisticated simulations, extensive pre-test 
training, and an ordinal scale (Bailey, 1990) is much greater than what most programs 
can afford.  On the other hand, the best approach might be that “if you want statistical 
significance, measure big differences.”   
Instead of focusing on statistical significance, fewer evaluation pilots often produce better 
results.  As told by Harper and Cooper (1984), “A classic handling qualities experiment 
(Kidd and Bull, 1963) showed that a few pilots evaluating for a longer period of time 
produced the same central tendency of the rating excursions as a larger group conducting 
shorter evaluations. What was lost with the larger group, however, was the quality, 
consistency, and meaningfulness of the pilot comment data.”   
3.2.10. Experiment Design 
While statistical significance in pilot ratings evaluations may not be realizable - given 
limited time and money - good experimental design practices are still important (e.g., see 
Kirk, 1982; Dukes, 1985).  The configuration run matrix should be properly balanced to 
avoid learning effects but it should also be tailored as possible and practical to create 
periodic "re-calibration" of the evaluation pilots as to "good" and "bad" flying qualities 
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(Bailey, 1990).  This offers the opportunity to maintain an "absolute" rather than relative 
sense of the rating scale and the possible range of flying qualities characteristics for the 
task.   
3.2.11. Blind Evaluations 
Experience has shown, and it is recommended (Harper and Cooper, 1984) that handling 
qualities evaluations should be conducted “blind” in that the pilots do not know the 
engineering details of the configuration.  This approach is not without detractors and 
dissenters, but it typically renders the evaluations free from unintended influences.   
Blind evaluations do not imply that the pilots do not know information that is critical to 
their evaluation or that the cockpit displays are changed or masked to create this 
anonymity.  The intent of withholding the details of a configuration is to provide a 
“clean-slate” for each evaluation.  If each configuration is evaluated in this way, the 
handling qualities influence will truly emerge, rather than pre-disposing an evaluation.  
For the purposes of evaluation, the evaluation pilot should observe and report the 
handling qualities of the configuration.  It is not necessarily constructive to bias them or 
have them try to “dig into” a configuration just to reveal the influence of an announced 
engineering change.   
During this process, encouragement should be given to the evaluation pilot to reinsure 
them that their evaluations are not “in left field.”  Otherwise, it can somewhat 
disconcerting to perform continual blind evaluations.  
Upon completion of the evaluations, the details of the configuration and the evaluation 
results should be revealed and discussed.  Additional “exploration” if warranted should 
be done at this time to tease out additional comments and engineering ideas and concepts. 
This is also useful for the evaluation pilot’s  knowledge and training. 
3.2.12. Repeat Evaluations 
Repeat evaluations should be conducted to test for evaluation consistency and training 
effects.  The repeated evaluations should be conducted just as the others – in the blind.   
Roughly 10 to 20% of the matrix is typically repeated.  Often these evaluations are 
selected as the most “interesting” configurations.  But experimental design and “re-
calibration” considerations (see Section 3.2.10) also are entered into the selection process 
for repeats.   
3.2.13. Length of Evaluations 
Just as in choosing the number of evaluation pilots, the same trade-off exists between 
pilot schedule/availability and the cost to run the simulation or flight test in determining 
the length of the evaluations. 
The typical protocol is to allow a practice run with the evaluation configuration, followed 
by two runs with the configuration for the record.  A third run for data can be flown by 
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the evaluation pilot, at the evaluation pilot’s request, if there was a discrepancy in the 
evaluation in the two evaluations.  The third run is the “tie-breaker.”  
3.2.14. Pre-Test Familiarization 
To achieve consistent handling qualities data, each evaluation pilot should be given 
training in the handling qualities and Cooper-Harper rating process sufficient to bring 
each participant to a common level.  This is particularly critical for new or untrained 
evaluation pilots.   
Part of the training for new evaluation pilots is indoctrination into the fact that handling 
qualities evaluations are an “observational process.”  Too often, inexperienced evaluators 
think that performance problems with the pilot-vehicle dynamics are their fault – not the 
result of deficient handling qualities.  They must be trained to understand that: a) they are 
serving as a pilot and the resultant pilot-vehicle dynamics are the result of, not the fault 
of, the pilot.  They should observe and report on the resultant dynamics and 
characteristics.   
For new evaluation pilots, the concepts of control compensation and workload, to a lesser 
extent, are new and somewhat difficult to fully grasp and accurately report.  Hands-on 
training must be used to ingrain these concepts. 
As noted by Harper and Cooper, 1984, “it is helpful to allow the pilot to evaluate 
handling qualities that span the range of the rating scale; that is, let him see good, bad, 
and in-between characteristics.  This is perhaps less important with experienced 
evaluation pilots, but it can be an important factor with operational pilots whose 
experience is confined to one or two airplanes.”  
In addition, the pre-evaluation phase should be used to re-emphasize the briefing and 
training for the handling qualities evaluation process.  In particular, this phase should 
provide hands-on training for: 
1. The selected task or required operation that the EP will evaluate. 
2. The task performance standards. 
3. The Cooper-Harper rating scale definitions and decision tree usage.  
4. The pilot comment card and associated rating scales. 
5. The manner in which the task should be performed and the degree of latitude 
that the EPs have in the exploration of handling qualities.   
6. The fact that “the pilot rating is given for a configuration in the context of its 
acceptability to the pilot for the specified flight phase (or task) and not in 
terms of its goodness with respect to a configuration already evaluated.” 
(Cooper and Harper, 1969).  Therefore, they should not be “reluctant to rate 
something as excellent or optimum for fear that a subsequent configuration 
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will be better than anything they considered possible.” (Cooper and Harper, 
1969).  Pilots should be encouraged to use the entire rating scale including 
ratings of 1. 
7. The testing procedure including: 1) the amount of information that the EP will 
receive regarding the configurations – even though, the configurations will be 
evaluated “in the blind;”  2) the number of runs to be used to formulate an 
evaluation; and, 3) their option to do additional runs should variability in the 
closed-loop characteristics or performance occur, thereby clouding their 
evaluation.    
3.3. Developmental Test & Evaluation 
Handling qualities evaluations are a critical component in the successful development of 
a new vehicle.  In the following, the lessons-learned in how to best develop fixed-wing 
and rotary-wing handling qualities and the use of handling qualities evaluations in this 
process are discussed. 
The ideal handling qualities development process is notionally shown in Figure 7.  This 
process captures the historical best practices for handling qualities development (Harper 
and Cooper, 1984; Bailey, 1990; National Research Council, 1997; NATO, 2000).   
 
 
Figure 7:  Handling Qualities Development Process 
First and foremost, history has shown that when the design considers handling qualities 
up-front and as an integral, critical part of the program, significantly less time and money 
are spent overall on handling qualities development than a comparable program where 
this up-front emphasis was not taken (e.g., Hodgkinson, 1990; NATO, 2000).  Fixing 
problems late in the design cycle are significantly more expensive (and typically less 
effective) than those fixed early in the design process.  The process involves the 
following constructs: 
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• Handling qualities design goals and criteria are established as an integral part 
of the program. These goals are based on design requirements, applicable 
specifications, and existing flying qualities metrics and past experience.   
• From these goals, the control law structure, flight control system (FCS) design 
and interfaces are established.   
• Off-line analysis are integral to understanding the handling qualities design 
and the technical issues that drive this design, and providing a basis from 
which to interpret the handling qualities evaluations. 
• Handling qualities evaluations form the principle means by which the design 
is assessed and improved.  To be effective, the evaluations must be fed-back 
into the design process to adjust the design goals, the FCS and interface 
design, and complement the off-line analyses.  In particular, the results of the 
handling qualities evaluations must be weighted and analyzed according to the 
selected tasks and the simulation fidelity used in the evaluations.   
• In this closed-loop process, the level of simulation fidelity and maturity of the 
control law implementation and vehicle dynamics and the associated 
analytical toolboxes should grow together as the design process matures. 
Testing results from actual hardware should be included as soon as possible 
and iron-bird, hardware-in-the-loop, with flight-fidelity interfaces (controllers 
and displays) should be planned and “flown” as early as possible.    
• The goal should be that, just prior to flight testing, very few differences, if 
any, will exist between the simulations and the actual flight test.  The only 
differences that should exist may be motion-cues (i.e., it is extremely difficult 
to simulate the complete motion environment of a new aircraft, even with 
sophisticated ground-based or in-flight simulators) and aero-dynamics 
parameter variations that were outside of the simulation math models. 
For the design of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft, an enormous body of time-tested 
FCS design criteria, experience, handling qualities criteria, and metrics are available.  
These works significantly simplify and improve the aircraft handling qualities design 
process.  This same wealth of available data is, unfortunately, not available for spacecraft 
handling qualities due to the four or five orders of magnitude difference in the number of 
manned spacecraft developed versus the number of manned aircraft.   
Without this strong legacy data, the design process and the use of handling qualities will 
be especially critical for future spacecraft developments.  An overarching lesson-learned 
from the aircraft handling qualities history is that “more flight control system problems 
are caused by human behavior than for technical reasons” (Hodgkinson, 1990).   
The following best-practices (NATO, 2000) are presented as they are directly relevant to 
the spacecraft handling qualities developments.  These are not meant to be 
comprehensive, but are “take-aways” appropriate for spacecraft: 
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1. Understand the operational requirements and the piloting task in each phase of 
the mission.  Ensure good communications with pilots is maintained in order 
to be fully aware of operational conditions. 
2. Avoid over-complexity and aim to keep the FCS design as simple and as 
visible as possible.  
3. Beware of control systems which appear to achieve excellent performance, 
mainly by open-loop compensation of the nominal model. Such performance 
can deteriorate very rapidly when modeling tolerances are introduced or when 
external disturbances are applied.  Such effects can be corrected by improving 
the closed-loop performance of the system, usually by increasing the feedback 
gains – although this is not always possible. 
4. Plan for an integrated simulation program and ensure that all team- members 
(especially pilots and managers) are clear that the various simulators are for 
evaluation purposes, to feed data back into the analytical design process. 
5. Identify the limitations of the simulation, including consideration of providing 
motion cues.  Be aware that although simulators are of great value if used 
correctly, they can give misleading results if the assessments are not 
rigorously controlled.  Simulation validation is highly desirable, if not 
essential. 
6. Use the piloted simulator to complement the off-line design and development 
tools, and to intercept any design deficiencies at an early stage.  The earlier 
problems are detected, the less it costs to fix them. 
7. Use common code and data for off-line and piloted simulation to avoid 
unnecessary software maintenance or translation (time and cost) and the 
possible introduction of errors in control law functionality.  Provide adequate 
off-line check cases to verify the control law implementation on the simulator. 
8. Simulation displays and controls need to be representative, in order to avoid 
coloring pilot opinion of the control laws. 
9. It is desirable that pilots are ‘calibrated’ in the use of development simulators, 
to aid their judgment of the simulated aircraft’s handling characteristics.  One 
way of achieving such calibration is to allow them to familiarize themselves 
with the simulator, by flying an aircraft with which they have flying 
experience. 
10. Deliberately search for handling problems, including the effects of design 
tolerances (parameter uncertainties) and failures.  Identify the worst cases and 
any hidden weaknesses in the design, and fully explain any unexpected 
simulation results. 
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11. Evaluate the ability of the pilot to enter the control loop, to help out the 
automatic functions.  Show that there is no tendency for divergence between 
the automatic and manual control functions. 
12. An Integrated Product Team for flight controls/flying qualities should be 
formed, covering all the skill areas required to develop a flight control system. 
This team should be responsible for tracking the design, development, and test 
of each component, and the implementation and verification of each interface. 
13. Deliberations should be encouraged, to bring into public view any problem or 
area of concern, so that all attendees can assess possible interactions with their 
area of responsibility, or where appropriate, potential solutions to “system” 
problems which may involve components other than those which encountered 
the anomaly.  Stress should be placed on including all components and 
interfaces in the discussions, since a system problem can be generated by a 
component that is performing well within the performance boundaries 
specified for it as a unit. 
Of these lessons-learned, the one that creates the most programmatic consternation is 
Number 10 – to deliberately search for handling problems.  This process is typically cited 
as one of the greatest failings for a program.  The reason is that it seems counter-intuitive 
to management.  Instead of the team working to build a good vehicle, it would seem this 
step is trying to find reasons for failure.  In fact, it is just the opposite.  By diligently 
searching for problems, including the effects of design tolerances (i.e., parametric 
uncertainties) and failures, testing worst case scenarios and searching for hidden 
weaknesses, the team is proactively heading off problems that might otherwise emerge 
late in the design.  This period of “exploration and discovery” must be conducted.  If 
properly done, this work makes subsequent test and verification phase a “non-event.”  
The team will have tested the system to its limits and fully understands the physics of the 
problem and its associated uncertainty levels to the extent that the test and verification 
will almost be an afterthought. 
3.4. Test and Verification 
Test and verification for flying qualities has been an issue in aircraft procurement from 
the very beginnings of aviation.  Handling qualities “acceptance test” was, in fact, a 
clause in the very first aircraft procurement – the Advertisement And Specification For A 
Heavier-Than-Air Flying Machine (Army Signal Corps, Specification No. 486, dated 
December 1907) - which specified that:  
“Before acceptance, a trial endurance flight will be required of at least one hour during 
which time the flying machine must remain continuously in the air without landing. It 
shall return to the starting point and land without any damage that would prevent it 
immediately starting upon another flight. During this trial flight of one hour, it must be 
steered in all directions without difficulty and at all time under perfect control and 
equilibrium.” 
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From this simple specification, test and verification requirements for handling qualities 
have significantly expanded.  Nonetheless, the essence of this first requirement is retained 
– that the vehicle must be “steered in all directions without difficulty and at all time under 
perfect control and equilibrium.” 
A survey of handling qualities practices is given in the following for commercial and 
military aircraft requirements for test and verification of handling qualities.   
3.4.1. US Military Fixed-Wing Aircraft 
The first comprehensive military handling qualities specifications were issued by the 
Navy Bureau of Aeronautics in 1942 and by the U.S. Army Air Force (AAF-C-1815) in 
1943 (Harper and Cooper, 1984).  AAF-C-1815 gave way in 1954 to a new version, MIL-
F-8785.  More importantly, a subsequent version, MIL-F-8785B, began the precedence 
within the handling qualities community that the true value in a specification document 
was not the detailed requirements, but an elaborate background information and users 
guide (BIUG) wherein the data which form the specification are contained.  The BIUG 
forms the historical lessons-learned for handling qualities which provide a continual 
improvement process for vehicle handling qualities. 
The use of military specifications fell out of favor in the 1980s. The last in this series was 
MIL-F-8785C issued in 1980 (see DoD, 1980).   
MIL-F-8785C was re-worked and updated into a military standard - MIL-STD-1797A in 
1995 - and this document was re-designated in 1997 as a handbook MIL-HDBK-1797A 
to be used for procurement guidance purposes (DoD, 1997).  Like MIL-F-8785B before 
it, the MIL-HDBK incorporates exhaustive BIUG material as its basis.   
Under MIL-HDBK-1797A, test and verification of handling qualities are stipulated using 
the following levels of flying qualities definitions: 
• Level 1 (Satisfactory):  Flying qualities clearly adequate for the mission flight 
phase.  Desired performance is achievable with no more than minimal pilot 
compensation. 
• Level 2 (Acceptable):  Flying qualities adequate to accomplish the mission 
flight phase, but some increase in pilot workload or degradation in mission 
effectiveness, or both, exists. 
• Level 3 (Controllable):  Flying qualities such that the aircraft can be 
controlled in the context of the mission flight phase, even though pilot 
workload is excessive or mission effectiveness is inadequate, or both.  The 
pilot can transition from Category A flight phase tasks (i.e., those tasks that 
rapid maneuvering, precision tracking, precise flight-path control) to Category 
B or C flight phases and these tasks (i.e., non-terminal and terminal flight 
phases such as cruise, approach and landing) can be completed.  It is to be 
noted that Level 3 is not necessarily defined as safe. 
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The handling qualities requirements depend upon whether the vehicle is operating in a 
normal or failure state:   
• For aircraft normal states, the minimum handling qualities requirement is 
Level 1 within the operational flight envelope, and Level 2 within the service 
flight envelope. 
• No single failure of any component or system shall result in dangerous or 
intolerable flying qualities. 
• Otherwise, for airplane failure states, the probability of encountering Level 2 
handling qualities must be less than 10–2 per flight within the operational 
flight envelope and the probability of encountering Level 3 handling qualities 
must be less than 10–4 per flight within the operational flight envelope, and 
less than 10–2 per flight within the service flight envelope.  (The Service 
Flight Envelope encompasses the Operational Flight Envelope with sufficient 
margins established between.) 
Verification is conducted in demonstration tasks using the resultant pilot comments and 
Cooper-Harper ratings as follows to define handling qualities levels: 
• For Level 1, the pilot comments must indicate satisfaction with aircraft flying 
qualities, with no worse than "mildly unpleasant" deficiencies, and median 
Cooper-Harper ratings must be no worse than 3.5 in calm air or in light 
atmospheric disturbances. 
• For Level 2, the pilot comments must indicate that whatever deficiencies may 
exist, aircraft flying qualities are still acceptable, and median Cooper-Harper 
ratings must be no worse than 6.5 in calm air or light atmospheric 
disturbances. 
• For Level 3, the pilot comments must indicate that the aircraft is at least 
controllable despite any flying qualities deficiencies, and median Cooper-
Harper ratings must be no worse than 9.5 in calm air or light atmospheric 
disturbances. 
This standard shows that the required flying qualities level depends upon: 1) the task; 2) 
the presence or absence of failures; 3) if the aircraft is flying within its nominal flight 
envelope; and, 4) the atmospheric conditions. 
The test and verification process under MIL-HDBK-1797 recommends three to six pilots 
per test condition.  Careful selection of the evaluation pilots is also recommended to 
reduce the variability in results.  All of the evaluation pilots must be test pilots trained in 
the use of the Cooper-Harper scale and they all must be experienced in the class of 
aircraft under evaluation. 
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3.4.2. Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 
To illustrate the application of MIL-HDBK-1797 concepts, the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) 
aircraft requirements are reviewed.  (The following material is based on recent personal 
communications with Mr. James “Buddy” Denham, Aeromechanics Senior Engineer at 
Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD.) 
For normal operations of the F-35 aircraft, Level 1 handling qualities are required.  For 
any single failure or combination of failures with a probability of occurrence greater than 
10–7 per flight hour, the vehicle shall be capable of: 
• Aerial refueling and landing at the original/alternate destination with Level 2 
(or better) handling qualities. 
• Cruise and descent with Level 3 (or better) handling qualities. 
• Terminating precision tracking or maneuvering tasks with Level 3 (or better) 
handling qualities. 
Handling qualities verification testing is conducted by a joint contractor/military pilot 
team who fly each task and provide Cooper-Harper ratings and comments.  Based on 
these combined Cooper-Harper ratings and comments, the military determines if the 
required handling qualities Level has been achieved; if outlier(s) exist, the comments 
should indicate if the problem was with the vehicle, the task workload, or unique to the 
particular evaluation. 
3.4.3. US Army Rotorcraft 
Helicopter flying qualities requirements were first established in MIL-H-8501 which was 
issued in 1952.  The U.S. Army began development of a handling qualities specification 
in 1982, and its initial Aeronautical Design Standard-33 (ADS-33A) was published in 
1987.  The current version is ADS-33E-PRF; see U.S. Army, 2000. 
Rotorcraft flying tasks are called Mission Task Elements (MTEs).  There are 23 MTEs 
such as: slalom, sidestep, hover, and landing. 
Handling qualities requirements for rotorcraft normal states mirror the fixed-wing 
standards: 
• The minimum Levels of flying qualities shall be Level 1 in the Operational 
Flight Envelopes and Level 2 in the Service Flight Envelopes. 
• Under failure conditions, the probability of encountering Level 2 handling 
qualities must be less than 2.5 x 10–3 per flight hour within the operational 
flight envelope.  The probability of encountering Level 3 handling qualities 
must be less than 2.5 x 10–5 per flight hour within the operational flight 
envelope, and less than 2.5 x 10–3 per flight hour within the service flight 
envelope 
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Under ADS-33, handling qualities verification is conducted by piloted evaluation where 
the Cooper-Harper rating scale assesses the workload and task performance required to 
perform the designated MTEs. 
Each MTE is assessed by at least three pilots.  These pilots shall each assign a subjective 
rating using the Cooper-Harper rating scale.  The arithmetic mean across all pilots of the 
Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Ratings (HQRs) forms the overall rating for the MTE.  
Level 1 is defined as the average HQR ≤ 3.5, Level 2 is defined as the averaged HQR ≤ 
6.5, and Level 3 is defined as an average HQR between 6.6 and 8.5. 
To meet Level 1 handling qualities requirements, the rotorcraft shall be rated Level 1 for 
all of the MTEs designated as appropriate to the rotorcraft's operational requirements. 
3.4.4. Federal Aviation Administration 
Unlike military specifications which serve as procurement documents, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts certifications of air vehicles against Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FARs) which establish whether they are safe to operate.   
The introduction of fly-by-wire flight control system technology in commercial transport 
aircraft necessitated that the FAA establish a systematic methodology to conduct 
certification flight testing for handling qualities (McElroy, 1988).  The unique handling 
characteristics, systems complexity, and failure modes effects rendered many of the 
previous and existing regulations and test techniques useless or inappropriate.  The FAA 
developed flight test certification procedures which follow, in many respects, the major 
elements of existing handling qualities evaluation methodologies, tailored to the civil 
application (Advisory Circular 25-7A, FAA, 1998).  Particular attention is focused within 
these techniques for the exploration of deficient handling qualities in the form of pilot-
induced oscillations (PIO) or Aircraft-Pilot Coupling (APC).  
Roughly following the Cooper-Harper decision tree, three levels of handling qualities are 
defined as shown in Figure 8.  The FAA levels of SAT, ADQ, and CON are given 
equivalents to Cooper-Harper pilot ratings and military standards (MIL-STD-1797 and 
MIL-F-8785).  
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Figure 8:  FAA Definitions Compared to Cooper-Harper Scale 
Three categories of general handling qualities tasks are flown: 
• Trim and unattended operation (e.g., dynamic response to pulse input) 
• Large amplitude maneuvering (e.g., pitch/roll upset recover) 
• Closed-loop precision regulation of flight path (e.g., ILS and precision 
touchdown) 
The minimum acceptable level of handling qualities (FAA, 1998) depends upon 
combinations of three factors: 
• Atmospheric Disturbance Level (Light, Moderate, or Severe) 
• Flight Envelope: (Normal Flight Envelope (NFE), Operational Flight 
Envelope (OFE), or Limit Flight Envelope (LFE) ) 
• Flight Control System Failure State 
Note that the FAA uses three flight envelope definitions (NFE, OFE, and LFE) as 
opposed to the military’s usage two (i.e., the OFE and SFE) where the NFE is associated 
with routine operations, the OFE is outside of the NFE and associated with warning 
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onset, and the LFE is the most outside flight envelope associated with aircraft design 
limits. 
The fundamental concept is that handling qualities should be evaluated and found 
acceptable for all conditions and tasks for which their probability of occurrence is not 
extremely remote (probability of occurrence less than 10-9 per flight hour).   
To identify which conditions must be evaluated and what the required handling qualities 
levels are, the following procedure is used. 
1. First, the probability of atmospheric condition ( Xa10 ) and flight envelope 
( Xe10 ) are determined using Figure 9.  For instance, the probability of light 
turbulence is 1.0 thus, Xa equals 0. For nominal moderate turbulence 
conditions, the probability of occurrence is 10-2 per flight hour, so Xa equals -
2.  The probability of being in the NFE is unity, thus, Xe = 0.; whereas, the 
nominal probability of being in the LFE is 10-4 per flight hour; thus, Xe is -4.   
2. Second, the probability of occurrence ( Xc10 ) for failure conditions of the FCS 
are computed. 
3. All combinations which are extremely remote are ignored; thus, those 
conditions where Xc + Xe + Xa ≤ -9 are not considered for evaluation.   
4. For those not extremely remote, the probability of the condition is determined 
as the combination of the FCS and flight envelope condition where: 
a. Probable Condition, (Xc+Xe) ≤ -5; 
b. Improbable Condition: -5 <  (Xc+Xe) < -9; 
5. The minimum acceptable handling qualities levels are given in Table II.   
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Table II: Minimum Acceptable Handling Qualities Levels (FAA AC25-7) 
Flight Condition 
(Xa+Xc) 
Atmospheric Disturbance (Xa) 
Light Moderate Severe 
Flight Envelope (Xe) 
NFE OFE LFE NFE OFE LFE NFE OFE LFE 
Probable Condition S S A A C C C C C 
Improbable Condition A A C C C     
 
Similar to the military standards for fixed- and rotary-wing handling qualities, this 
evaluation procedure provides a probabilistic approach to handling qualities requirements 
that includes flight control system failure mode.  However, unlike the military, the 
influence of flight envelope and atmospheric conditions are included in the probabilistic 
analysis.   
 
Figure 9:  Derivation of Probability Conditions 
The verification procedure to ensure that the design meets these requirements is less 
clear.  While equivalence of the SAT, ADQ, and CON levels to the Cooper-Harper scale 
are given, the AC does not explicitly state whether the pilots provide specific Cooper-
Harper ratings or simply provide overall FAA ratings of SAT, ADQ, or CON.  The use of 
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comments and ratings are also not detailed.  The number of evaluation pilots is also not 
stipulated, but common practice is that a consensus approach from FAA test pilots is used 
to ultimately decide whether the aircraft’s handling qualities meet the requirements.   
3.4.5. Summary 
The military and commercial handling qualities standards are consistent but differ based 
on whether they are a certification standard (FAA) or a procurement vehicle (MIL-
STDs).  A summary is provided in Table III.   
Each requires Level 1 handling qualities for normal operating conditions within the 
operational flight envelope.  In all cases, a slight degradation in handling qualities is 
allowable: 
• When operating outside of the operational flight envelope.   
• In atmospheric conditions greater the “light” turbulence. 
• When failure conditions are present.  
The allowable degradation depends upon the probability of occurrence.  Otherwise, Level 
1 handling qualities for even low probability conditions could create unreasonable 
expense in designing extensive flight control system redundancy and elaborate control 
laws. 
Table III:  Summary of Aircraft Handling Qualities Requirements In Failure State 
Conditions (Within OFE and Without Atmospheric Disturbances) 
Handling Qualities 
Requirements  
Failure State Probability of Occurrence 
Level 1 Level 2 
MIL-HDBK-1797 <10-2 per flight <10-4 per flight 
F-35 <10–7 per flight hour  
ADS-33 <2.5 x 10–3 per flight hour  <2.5 x 10–5 per flight hour  
FAA <10-5 per flight hour <10-9 per flight hour 
 
4. Spacecraft Handling Qualities Experience 
While the number of experiences within the space-/exploration-domain pales in 
comparison to the wealth of aeronautics knowledge and experience, there are space-
domain lessons-learned and experiences in manual control and handling qualities.  An 
overview of these works is provided in the following. 
4.1. Gemini 
Under the Gemini program, manual control and handling qualities investigations 
primarily focused on rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) since this 
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task was one of the primary goals of Gemini as a stepping-stone for the lunar landing 
objective of the Apollo program.   
During Gemini, this work investigated the handling qualities influence of such 
parameters as:  
• Spacecraft attitude control mode, control power, target lighting and target 
oscillatory motion (Riley, Jaquet, Bardusch, and Deal, 1965; Riley, Jaquet, 
and Cobb, 1966);  
• “Remote” docking using Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) (Long, 
Pennington, and Deal, 1965); 
• Visual aides, in day and night conditions, to align to a docking target 
(Pennington, Hatch, Long, and Cobb, 1965); 
• Hand controllers, instruments, and control modes (Jaquet and Riley, 1965); 
• Visual simulation compared to “full-size” docking (Riley, Jaquet, Pennington, 
and Brissenden, 1966); 
• Visual aides and attitude control modes in lunar orbit (Hatch, Riley, and 
Cobb, 1964). 
These studies provided a wealth of data especially for evaluating “first-principles” since 
on-orbit RPOD had never been conducted prior to much of this work.   
Unfortunately, application of these works to modern systems suffers in two critical 
aspects:  
1)  the handling qualities data used the Cooper rating scale (Cooper, 1957), not 
the Cooper-Harper pilot rating scale (Cooper and Harper, 1969) which is 
today’s accepted standard. A translation from the Cooper scale to the Cooper-
Harper scale is not possible; they are two distinctly different rating 
methodologies.    
2)  for these “foundational” works, analog simulations were almost exclusively 
conducted; hence, critical digital flight control system effects and control law 
techniques were not evaluated.  
It should also be noted that the docking tolerances for Gemini were significantly larger 
than those identified for the current and planned spacecraft (e.g., see AIAA, 1993). 
4.2. Apollo 
In preparation for Apollo, spacecraft manual control and handling qualities evaluations 
focused on specific Apollo issues.   
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4.2.1. Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, and Docking 
Since the basic principles of RPOD were proven under Gemini, RPOD evaluations 
investigated specific Apollo issues.  
One significant difference between Apollo and Gemini, specific to RPOD, was the 
evaluation of Lunar Module (LM) docking.  Two studies, in particular, were conducted.  
Full-size, pilot-in-the-loop simulations were conducted at LaRC’s rendezvous docking 
simulator.   
The first study (Pennington, Hatch, and Driscoll, 1966) was designed to investigate the 
pilot's ability to complete a successful docking by using only visual information for 
command and service module (CSM) transposition docking with the LM during the trans-
lunar trajectory (between earth and moon).  Evaluations consisted of: 
• Control modes (rate command, rate command with attitude hold, and direct) 
with no thruster failures and single and double thruster quadrant failures. 
• Dockings with tumbling targets 
A second study (Hatch, Pennington, and Cobb, 1967) evaluated the Lunar-Orbit-
Rendezvous of the LM with the CSM.   
The CSM was the target vehicle - docking the ascent stage of the LM with its top hatch to 
the CSM using only visual observation of the target for guidance information.  The 
objectives of the simulation program included: 
1.  The feasibility of docking the LM with its top hatch to the CSM  
2.  The efficacy of different visual aides  
3.  The effect of lighting conditions  
4.  The impact of different control modes (rate-command-attitude-hold mode, 
rate command, and direct attitude control). 
5. The influence of the pilot wearing a pressurized suit. 
On orbit test and evaluation of lunar orbit docking showed that using the LM to complete 
the docking was not desirable.  The “torque to inertia ratio” for the LM was too high 
(Stafford, Armstrong, Collins, and Cooper, 1969) to allow precise, repeatable docking.  
Instead, the LM was the target and the CSM served as the chaser for the last 3 to 4 feet of 
docking in lunar orbit.    
The parametric evaluations of Gemini and the specific developments for Apollo 
established the RPOD state-of-the-art.  So much so, in fact, that as the Space Shuttle was 
being developed, RPOD was assumed to be a lower priority in the early days of the 
program (i.e., it had less technical risk) compared to other system development tasks 
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(Goodman, 2006).  It wasn’t until later in the program that the unique attributes of the 
Shuttle design for RPOD were recognized, resulting in “complex operational work-
arounds over the life of the program” (Goodman, 2006) that might have otherwise been 
mitigated earlier in the Shuttle design by continued parametric evaluation of handling 
qualities requirements. 
4.2.2. Atmospheric Entry 
Several studies were conducted evaluating the pilot’s ability to monitor and control an 
Apollo-type vehicle during atmospheric entry.  Several of these studies were performed 
in centrifuges to approximate the motion cues (g-levels) for entry.    
For instance, in one study (Wingrove, Stinnett, and Innis, 1964), pilot-in-the-loop 
evaluations were conducted to evaluate the ability of a pilot to: 1) control a reentry 
vehicle to various constant acceleration levels, 2) control entry range based on various 
displays and control augmentation levels; and, 3) perform monitoring and recovery 
procedures.    
The results illustrated that basic velocity and range-to-go information displays are 
unsatisfactory for normal operation for pilot control of range-to-go; however, satisfactory 
performance is attainable if lead-information is displayed and the displays include roll 
rate or roll-angle command information.  Simple methods for pilot monitoring of 
automated entries were developed and proven feasible.  In fact, successful pilot-
controlled transitions from skip-out to safe entry trajectories were documented. 
4.2.3. High-Altitude Abort 
A fixed-base simulation study (Meintel, Garren, and Driscoll, 1966) was conducted to 
determine whether a pilot could manually orient the Apollo vehicle to the proper reentry 
attitude following a high altitude (120,000 ft and above) abort by only using the "out-the-
window" visual scene as an attitude reference.  This work served as a follow-on study to 
a contractor study which showed that the flight crew could perform stabilization and 
orientation of the vehicle during a high-altitude abort, if attitude information was 
provided on head-down displays.   
This study showed that: 
1.  If a visual yaw reference is available, such as a landmark or a vapor trail, 
manual orientation is possible for all aborts above a 120,000-foot altitude 
except the single-control-system Saturn V 120,000-foot abort. 
2.  Heading determination by using ground tracking, which requires a broken 
cloud cover along the orbital track, appears feasible for aborts above a 
150,000-foot altitude.  This technique is not usable for 120,000-foot aborts 
because of insufficient control time for accurate ground tracking.  
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4.  Control system failures which occur during the visually-controlled abort 
maneuver greatly affect the pilot's ability to orient the vehicle to the heat-
shield-forward attitude. 
5.  An unpressurized pressure suit does not affect the pilot's ability to perform the 
orientation maneuvers. 
4.2.4. Lunar Landing 
Fixed-base simulation and flight test evaluations were conducted using flight test and in-
flight simulation vehicles (Jarvis, 1967; Matranga and Walker, 1965; Matranga et al, 
1963) to support the development of acceptable control law and control characteristics for 
the lunar landing task.  These works were used to develop the controllers and pilot-
vehicle interface requirements for Apollo. 
The initial Lunar landing handing qualities requirements (Cheatham and Hackler, 1966) 
revolved around the acceptability/utility of control law types for this task:  
1. Proportional attitude thruster design with direct command through the 
rotational hand controller (RHC).  
2. Proportional attitude thruster design with a rate command system through a 
RHC.   
3. On-off Thruster design with direct command through the RHC. 
4. On-off Thruster design with a rate command system through the RHC.  
In Stengel (1970), the influences of digital phase plan controllers and quadratic input 
shaping from this baseline were addressed which created the “second generation” 
capability for Apollo.  Additionally, handling qualities and pilot-vehicle interface issues, 
specific to the Apollo program, are well-summarized in Hatcher et al (1968), including 
the ability to monitor the automatic systems, re-designate the planned landing site, 
establish appropriate thrust response sensitivity, and provide the critical out-the-window 
visibility for Lunar Landing in Apollo.  In fact, “the constraints placed on crew visibility 
by the design of the LM window and by trajectory parameters make the viewing of the 
programmed landing site a major problem.” 
4.3. Space Shuttle 
4.3.1. Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, and Docking 
As mentioned before, the success of Apollo led the Space Shuttle program to assume that 
RPOD had less technical risk compared to other system development tasks (Goodman, 
2006).  It wasn’t until later in the program that the unique attributes of the Shuttle design 
for RPOD were recognized.  The issues included rendezvous operations changes, control 
law modifications for reduced plume impingement (i.e., the “low-Z” control law mode), 
and the unplanned development of relative navigation sensors (Crewman Optical 
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Alignment Sight (COAS) and CCTV camera ranging rulers) and, by the 1990s, trajectory 
control sensor and hand-held Lidar. (Goodman, 2006).   
4.3.2. Approach and Landing 
The Space Shuttle program took on the challenge of providing a manual landing 
capability for an operational vehicle returning from orbit.  The initial plans required the 
development of an operational capability of landing day or night in all types of weather 
on a 15,000-ft runway. The control system design was complicated by the requirement 
for a center-of-gravity position that ranged from statically stable to statically unstable 
(Powers, 1986).  Flight path control is complicated because the center of rotation of the 
pitch axis is ahead of the pilot’s position in the cockpit which means the pilot does not 
perceive any change in flight path for almost a full second after control input (NATO, 
2000) 
Three levels of control system performance were required for Shuttle (Powers, 1986), 
depending on the type and number of system failures.  
• Level 1 was generally required for nominal and one failure state operating 
conditions, Level 2 was required in the event of two failures, and Level 3 was 
required for two failed auxiliary power units.  
• Level 1 requirements consisted of system stability margins (high-frequency 
crossover gain margin of 6-dB and a 30-deg phase margin); time response 
criteria that were derived from a composite of then-available handling 
qualities criteria; and pilot ratings had to be better than 3 from real-time 
simulation.  
• Level 2 requirements included lower stability margins and pilot ratings better 
than 6. 
• The Level 3 requirements specified that the vehicle would be controllable.  
The design process was heavily reliant on real-time simulation.   
In 1977, low-speed characteristics of the Orbiter were evaluated in-flight during the 
approach and landing test (ALT) program.  The first four landings were on the Edwards 
dry lakebed and were uneventful.  In general, the flying qualities were quite good.  The 
fifth landing, however, was on the 15,000-ft concrete runway.  
ALT-5 resulted in a spectacular PIO.  The pilot’s touchdown aim point was about 5,000 
ft beyond the runway threshold.  The pilot perceived an overshoot of the intended 
touchdown point and attempted to correct, triggering an ensuing PIO. Records indicate 
almost continuous elevon rate limiting with a pitch PIO started seven seconds prior to 
first touchdown and a lateral PIO five seconds before touchdown (NATO, 2000).  After 
the first touchdown and bounce, a more pronounced lateral PIO occurred, followed by a 
series of over-controlled skip and hop motions.  
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This event resulted in numerous activities, none of which included a fundamental change 
in the flight control system or control laws.  A control law re-design to fundamentally fix 
the handling qualities deficiencies was not pursued since this late change would have 
been extremely expensive (cost and schedule).  Instead, the modifications included: 
• An adaptive stick gain algorithm that would reduce the pilot and system 
command gain whenever PIO conditions were approached. 
• Increasing the stick force gradient by a factor of two. 
• Changing priority rate-limiting logic of the elevens to reduce the interactions 
between the roll and pitch axes.  
• A dedicated, elaborate training regiment using Shuttle Training Aircraft, since 
the required pilot skill is very exacting, as the pilot must learn new control 
techniques to avoid exciting the inherently poor flight path response 
characteristics. 
The redesign and training regiment significantly improved the Shuttle handing qualities 
performance but did not completely eliminate the underlying deficiencies.  For instance, 
on STS-3 (March, 1982) Columbia was in an incipient PIO at touchdown.  A high 
crosswind caused an overshoot of the final approach course coming off of the Heading 
Alignment Circle.  The result was a high-gain situation on short final, with the vehicle 
being in the beginning phases of a PIO just as it touched down.  There was also about a 1 
½-cycle oscillation as the nose was lowered, resulting in a pronounced “slam-down” 
(NATO, 2000).  
Lessons-learned (NATO, 2000) from the Shuttle recommended the following: 
• Improved flight control system designs in the form of better flight path 
command logic were needed.  
• Improved flight path awareness for the pilot, in terms of display logic was 
needed. 
• The flight control system (time domain) design criteria were inappropriate; 
other available criteria were not used but should have been; new criteria were 
also needed to cover the unique characteristics of the Shuttle.  
• Data from other lifting body flight tests (e.g., M2F2) were discounted but 
should have been referenced. 
4.4. Applicability of Aircraft HQ to Spacecraft 
The handling qualities issues cited above have almost exclusively been for situations 
involving direct manual control of a vehicle.  Planned and future spacecraft, on the other 
hand, will be nominally operated, for a vast majority of scenarios, under automatic 
control.  In the following, lessons-learned in defining “handling qualities” in the case of 
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highly automated vehicles are discussed in terms of how this work applies to these 
emerging vehicles.   
Also, an attempt is made to draw analogies between spacecraft manual control tasks and 
aircraft evaluation task.  The concept is to draw from the lessons-learned in the 
development of these aircraft-based evaluation tasks for the development of spacecraft 
handling qualities tasks. 
4.4.1. Automation “Handling Qualities” 
Human-automation interface requirements are not often thought of as being part of 
“manual control” handling qualities requirements, but they should be.  Handling qualities 
is an evaluation of the performance and workload associated with the pilot-vehicle 
dynamic system (Figure 1).  The only substantive difference between “manual control” 
and “automated control” is the physical process of activating the controller (i.e., whether 
it is a human or automation system at the controls).   
Although a control task may be automated, history has shown that the best automation 
designs are “human-centered.”  They are designed understanding the human needs for 
monitoring, intervention, and adaptation in concert with the automation.  The rationale is 
that unless the automation is fool-proof and perfect, a human-centered automation design 
takes advantage of the fact that the world’s best adaptive controller – the pilot – can 
intervene, adapt, and overcome as necessary in the event that the automation is not 
successful.    
The aeronautics-domain experience with automation has shown that human-automation 
interface requirements should be developed and evaluated in parallel and in concert with 
the vehicle’s handling qualities.  Automation technology was originally developed with 
the hope of “increasing the precision and economy of operation while, at the same time, 
reducing the operator workload and training requirements.  It was considered possible to 
create a system that required very little or no operator intervention and therefore, reduced 
or eliminate the chance of human error within the system” (Sarter, Woods, Billings, 
1997).  These precepts have gone largely unrealized.  Research has shown that 
automation has, in fact, caused a rash of aviation accidents and incidents due to the 
introduction of automation aids, because of the adverse interaction between the 
automation and the human operators (Billings, 1997).   
“Human-centered” automation designs principles are many and varied (e.g., see Billings, 
1997).  "Human-centered designs" should not merely be a process where a human factors 
team has been involved or tests have shown that humans can operate them.  While such 
designs and design practices may produce acceptable results, three key principles for 
human-automation interaction must be addressed: 
1. The automation must be observable by its human operator, (i.e., the human 
operator is appropriately informed). 
2.  The current and near-term future behaviors of the automation must be 
comprehensible, understood and predictable by the human operator.  
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3.  The automation must be contextually appropriate for its application, designed 
to complement the human operator, and not automated just because it is 
possible..   
These human-automation interaction issues are mirrored in the lessons-learned from 
Apollo and their use of automated entry guidance and control (Graves and Harpold, 
1972): 
• “Guidance logic must be simple… the more complicated the guidance logic, 
the more difficult the guidance is to monitor during the mission.  The 
monitoring difficulty complicates the development of the monitoring 
procedures and increased the time required for flight-crew training.”    
• “The guidance logic should be compatible with a backup or an alternate 
trajectory control procedures.  That is, once an anomaly is detected in the 
trajectory control of the primary guidance system, an alternative technique 
must be available that will allow satisfactory trajectory control to be 
implemented so that the spacecraft will land near the originally selected 
target.”   
• “The interaction between guidance system performance and attitude control 
system performance must be recognized.  Realistic attitude control system 
response requirements must be established, and guidance-logic design must 
minimize the need for rapid response.”  
The “handling qualities” of automated tasks (i.e., human-automation interface 
requirements) should be evaluated in three ways: 
1) Pilots should conduct handling qualities of all tasks to be flown by the 
automation.  This is not to imply that these tasks could or should be manually 
flown.  By conducting these evaluations, the pilot gains an appreciation of 
what the automation must do to successfully control the vehicle.  This 
knowledge is critical for understanding the behavior of the automation and 
what the pilot must do in the event (likely or unlikely) that they need or want 
to intervene or take-over. This task also defines what information (e.g., out-
the-window visual cues or displays) are needed by the human to monitor, 
control, or interact with the automation. 
2) Classic “handling qualities” evaluations must also be conducted in scenarios 
where, during the conduct of automated tasks, the pilot takes control of the 
vehicle and completes the task or temporarily takes-over and then re-engages 
the automation.  This task evaluates the ability of the crew to take-over for or 
to intervene with the automation and the potential for upsets or discontinuities 
in the automation during this process.     
3) Finally, “handling qualities” evaluations must also be conducted in scenarios 
where, during the conduct of automated tasks, the automation fails (passively 
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or actively) and the pilot must take control of the vehicle and complete the 
task.  
The aeronautics-domain has numerous handling qualities requirements associated with 
automation, principally focusing on the failure mode effects (e.g., “No single failure of 
any component or system (of the automatic FCS) shall result in dangerous or intolerable 
flying qualities” MIL-STD-1797A) or the transition from automatic to manual control 
(e.g., “The aircraft motions following sudden aircraft system or component failures shall 
be such that dangerous conditions can be avoided by the pilot, without requiring unusual 
or abnormal corrective action,“ MIL-STD-1797A).  Requirements are available which 
attempt to quantify the handling qualities due to transient motions (aircraft acceleration) 
between automated and manual flight.   
Further, the requirements stipulate that a reasonable time delay between the automation 
failure and initiation of pilot corrective action should be used in determining the 
acceptability of the failure transient.  A minimum time delay value of 1 second is often 
used, but greater delays are suggested depending upon whether the task is being 
conducted with the pilot’s undivided or divided attention and their associated workload, 
if the failure occurrence is cued by a readily apparent acceleration, rate, or sound that will 
definitely indicate to the pilot that a failure has occurred, whether they are flying with 
their hands on or off the controls, plus an additional delay may be necessary to represent 
the time required for the pilot to diagnose the situation before they initiate corrective 
action (e.g., see FAA AC25-07, MIL-STD-1797A) 
4.4.2. Spacecraft Task Analogies 
An attempt is made to draw analogies between spacecraft manual control tasks and 
aircraft evaluation tasks.  The concept is to draw from the lessons-learned in the 
development of these aircraft-based evaluation tasks for the development of spacecraft 
handling qualities tasks.  Obvious differences in control response characteristics and the 
lack of aerodynamic forces may obviate these comparisons, but this effort to extract some 
lessons-learned is, nonetheless, tried. 
 RPOD: Probe-and-Drogue Refueling:   
The aeronautics-domain task most like RPOD would be probe-and-drogue refueling 
(Figure 10).  This task requires the aircraft (i.e., the refueling aircraft, or “maneuvering 
vehicle” in spacecraft terminology) to plug its probe into the drogue from the tanker (i.e., 
the “target vehicle” in spacecraft terminology).  
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Figure 10: Probe-and-Drogue Refueling 
The probe-and-drogue refueling task involves the following: 
• An initial condition behind the tanker is used with possible vertical and 
horizontal displaced from the drogue as well.  Vertical and horizontal 
displacement increases the task severity but may not be operationally 
acceptable from a safety-of-flight perspective (e.g., unacceptable engine wake 
or wing-tip vortices).  
• A closure-rate is established to approach the drogue and make contact.  
Constant closure-rates are usually encouraged since, to do otherwise, would 
introduce task variability.   
• Sometimes, the closure-rate is stopped at a pre-contact position, and the 
evaluation pilot is asked to “touch” the basket at the 12, 3, 6, and 9 o’clock 
basket positions with the probe.  The ability to do this task with precision and 
low workload demonstrates the ability of the pilot to control the probe (as 
opposed to a “lucky stab” at the basket.).  This type of procedure can also be 
used as a form of “tracking task” – see Table IV.  
• Once a connection is made, the pilot must maintain an acceptable refueling 
station-keeping position for a certain amount of time. 
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• Numerous attempts at contact are used.  Because of aerodynamics, the basket 
will typically move as the refueling vehicle approaches; not always in a 
repeatable manner.  
• Typical task performance standards are shown in Table IV.   
The primary difference between this aviation task and the spacecraft RPOD task is that 
the basket (drogue) is subject to continual, time-varying aerodynamic influences.  These 
influences manifest themselves as basket movements which depend upon the 
characteristics of tanker and its refueling system (e.g., the type of basket and drogue, the 
length of hose deployed, its location on the aircraft – e.g., body mounted or wing 
mounted), the atmospheric conditions (winds and turbulence), and the location of the 
refueling aircraft probe and its forebody aerodynamics.   
Unlike the RPOD task, the accuracy of hitting the target is not used in the probe-and-
drogue refueling task.  The primary reason is that it would be difficult to instrument and 
record these parameters.  Instead, successful hook-up is the manifestation of achieving 
the desired task performance.  If the probe hits too hard, is off-angled, or doesn’t hit hard 
enough, a successful hook-up will not be achieved.  Observation can also be used to 
directly see if the probe hit the webbing or not.    
Table IV:  Probe and Drogue Refueling Task Performance Standards 
Probe-and-Drogue 
References   
Task Performance Standards 
Desired Performance Adequate Performance  
MIL-STD-1797A No PIO. 
Hook-up without touching basket 
webbing in at least 50% of 
attempts. 
Hook-up in at least 50% of 
attempts. 
F-35 Probe and 
Drogue Tracking  
(1 Min Duration) 
(Unpublished) 
Maintain the probe between the 
edge of the basket and 10 ft aft of 
the basket. 
Maintain the probe vertically and 
horizontally within one-half  
basket diameter. 
No contact with basket. 
Note: Momentary excursion 
outside the desired limits that are 
considered to be a result of 
basket motion and beyond the 
control of the EP should be 
ignored. . 
Maintain the probe between the 
edge of the basket and 10 ft aft of 
the basket. 
Maintain the probe vertically and 
horizontally the edges of the  
basket (unless sudden basket 
motion is caused by the tanker or 
external influences). 
No contact with basket. 
Note: Momentary excursion 
outside the desired limits that are 
considered to be a result of basket 
motion and beyond the control of 
the EP should be ignored. .. 
 
The probe-and-drogue refueling task can be broken down into components as a way to 
get better diagnostics of task performance and its handling qualities since there are many, 
many uncontrollable factors which influence the resultant task performance and handling 
qualities.  The probe tracking task is one such way of generating diagnostic data.  
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Other than the notable dynamics differences, another key difference between the Space- 
and Aero-domains is that the probe-and-drogue refueling task is done strictly with out-
the-window visual cues.  No cockpit displays are measurably involved.   
 Atmospheric Entry: Terrain-Following    
The closest analogy to the atmospheric entry task may be a terrain-following task (Figure 
11).   
In a terrain-following task, the pilot is tasked to fly at a constant altitude above the 
terrain, following a planned route over the ground.  The pilot’s task is use attitude 
changes to maintain this trajectory.   
The terrain-following task involves: 
• A route of flight is chosen.  Obviously, the more undulations in the terrain, the 
higher degree of maneuvering and hence, the greater difficulty of the task. 
• In addition, the speed along the route and the altitude above ground level, also 
drive the task difficulty.  Higher speeds and lower altitudes significantly 
increase the task demands.  Pitch and roll control are essential to the task.   
• Typically, guidance is provided on a Head-Up Display (HUD) whereby the 
task involves following a guidance cue which provides a reference for the 
pilot’s manual control to achieve a terrain following (TF) performance 
objective.   
• This task can also be flown by an auto-pilot; i.e., automatic TF system where 
the pilot monitors the performance and intervenes as necessary using this 
same display data with supplemental information from other aural and visual 
cues in the cockpit. 
• If the TF guidance cue is commanding an attitude profile and thus, indirectly 
commanding the vertical and lateral TF flight path profile, the pilot will use an 
attitude reference symbol as the control reference.  The advantage of 
commanding an attitude profile is that attitude reference is easier for a pilot to 
fly because of the direct interconnection between the control reference and 
pilot controller input.  The difficulty in using attitude command guidance is 
that the guidance command will be continually moving and adjusting to 
maintain the TF flight profile.  The pilot may lose an intuitive concept of the 
flight path and will only be reacting to attitude commands.  This increases the 
task workload.  Desired and adequate performance standards for an attitude 
tracking task, analogous to a TF profile, is shown in Table V.   
• If the TF guidance cue is directly commanding a vertical and lateral flight 
path profile, the pilot will use the HUD Flight Path Marker (i.e., the velocity 
vector) as the control reference.  The advantage of commanding a flight path 
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profile is that it is directly related to the performance objective and it should 
intuitively correspond to the outside visual references, if available to the pilot.  
(The HUD could also be augmented to show the TF profile (e.g., a pathway 
display concept), allowing the pilot’s to see the upcoming path profile and 
better anticipate the required control activity and reduce the task workload.)  
The disadvantage is that the flight path control task is more demanding for the 
pilot because of the aerodynamic lag between attitude and flight path.   
• Desired and adequate performance standards for a TF task are shown in Table 
V.  The performance standards differ if a flight path reference is used  (e.g., 
see Christensen et al, 1998) or if an attitude reference is used.   
 
Figure 11:  Terrain Following 
The task performance standards shown in Table V would need to be adapted to the 
display interface for the particular task, to ensure that the performance standards are 
controllable and observable for the pilot.  For instance, the flight path reference 
performance standard assumed that the guidance command was in the form of a box.  
This may not necessarily be so in all cases, so the task standard would have to be changed 
accordingly.  For the attitude tracking reference, time-on-target statistics can also be used 
as a performance measure. 
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Table V:  Terrain Following Task Performance Standards 
Terrain Following 
Task   
Task Performance Standards 
Desired Performance Adequate Performance  
FPM Reference 
(Christenson et al, 
1998) 
 
Keeping at least half of the flight 
path marker (FPM) in the Terrain 
Following Guidance box for the 
entire route with no more than five 
excursions per minute.  (This 
represented the pilot following the 
DBTC cue to within +/- 0.2 g.)    
No PIO (pilots were told that 
overshoots while correcting back to 
the box were not to be counted as 
excursions.)  
Following the Terrain Following 
Guidance with the flight path marker and 
keeping the FPM at least touching the 
guidance box for the entire route with no 
more than five excursions per minute. 
(This represented the pilot following the 
cue to within +/- 0.4 g.( 
(pilots were told that overshoots while 
correcting back to the box were not to be 
counted as excursions.) 
Attitude Reference 
(MIL-STD-1797  
et al) 
Time to acquire: TBD 
Pitch and roll attitude maintained 
within 5 mils in pitch, 5 degrees in 
bank; 
Overshoots: no more than one 
greater than 5 mils, none to exceed 
10 mils in pitch; or 5 degrees, none 
to exceed 10 degrees in roll; 
No PIO 
Time to acquire: TBD 
Pitch and roll attitude maintained within 
10 mils in pitch, 10 degrees in bank; 
Overshoots: no more than two greater 
than 5 mils, none to exceed 20 mils in 
pitch; or 5 degrees; none to exceed 20 
degrees in roll. 
 
The analogy between the aircraft terrain-following task and the spacecraft atmospheric 
re-entry task is loose.   
• The similarity is that the task may be flown using attitude or flight path 
references.  Ultimately, the flight path trajectory performance is the desired 
result.  The task may be automatically flown.  Also, the commanded pitch and 
roll commands typically lead the flight path by a significant amount to avoid 
overshooting; thus, it is not intuitively or immediately obvious how the 
attitude tracking performance relates to the flight path tracking objective. 
• The analogy between aeronautics and spacecraft quickly breaks down from 
the standpoint that the aero-TF task is directly visible for the pilot – that is, 
they can see the terrain in front of the aircraft if flown in visual flight 
conditions.  Also, the flight dynamics in the terrain-following task are 
typically constant, unlike the atmospheric re-entry task where the 
aerodynamic influences vary tremendously.  Finally, the atmospheric re-entry 
task is primarily a roll-only task, unlike the aeronautics-domain TF task. 
 Ascent Control: Take-off and Climb-Out:   
The closest analogy to the ascent control task may be a takeoff and climb-out task.   
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In a takeoff and climb-out task, the pilot is tasked to rotate the aircraft to a target attitude 
reference.  Upon lift-off, the pilot regulates the aircraft attitude to maintain a flight path 
(vertical and lateral).   
The takeoff and climb-out task involves: 
• A take-off rotation speed and target attitude is determined.   
• A pitch rotation rate is also chosen.  (The rotation rate will influence the task 
demands.)   
• Upon rotation, the pilot is tasked to regulate the aircraft attitude and maintain 
a target climb-rate and hold a constant track (i.e., lateral flight path).  The 
specific task demands are dependent upon the aircraft cockpit instrumentation.  
If HUD equipped, vertical flight path angle and track angle requirements can 
be used.  Otherwise, rate-of-climb and heading angles targets can be used.  
• Through the climb-out, the aircraft undergoes configuration changes (flap and 
gear position) and accelerates to a target climb-out speed.  These changes 
induce significant aerodynamic changes which additional complications to the 
pilot’s ability to maintain the required flight path. 
• Attitude and / or flight path command guidance may be given to the pilot to 
assist in this task.  Typically, however, the primary flight information already 
on the displays is sufficient for the pilot to complete this task. 
• Task performance standards for this task are shown in Table VI. 
 
Table VI:  Take-off and Climb-Out Task Performance Standards 
Take-off and 
Climb-Out Task   
Task Performance Standards 
Desired Performance Adequate Performance  
MIL-STD-1797A Attitude control on rotation: Keep 
within ≈1 degree of takeoff attitude 
with no more than one overshoot, 
not to exceed TBD degrees. 
Flightpath control: Keep within ≈1 
degree of specified climb-out angle. 
Groundtrack: Keep aircraft within 
≈10 feet of runway centerline or 
within ≈2 degrees of runway 
heading.  
No PIO 
Attitude control on rotation: Keep 
within ≈2 degrees of takeoff attitude 
with no more than one overshoot, not 
to exceed TBD degrees. 
Flightpath control: Keep within ≈2 
degrees of specified climb-out angle, 
but not less than 0 deg. 
Groundtrack: Keep aircraft within ≈25 
feet of runway centerline or within ≈5 
degrees of runway heading 
 
The analogy between the aircraft take-off and climb-out task and the spacecraft ascent 
control task is weak.  The similarity is that the task uses attitude to track a flight path 
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reference trajectory.  The flight dynamics and g-loading differences between the two 
tasks are very significant. 
5. Recommendations 
Historical evidence has shown that a design which provides excellent handling qualities 
enables four key benefits: 
1. Task performance which meets the mission requirements both in terms of 
precision and accuracy, with tolerable pilot workload. 
2. A more robust vehicle system, elastic to changes in task, stressors, and 
external disturbances, including pilot distraction.   
3. Less sensitivity to pilot technique and hence, lower training costs. 
4. Less risk in the design and higher safety margins in the operation of the 
vehicle.   
Handling qualities evaluations are a critical component in the successful development of 
a new vehicle.  The lessons-learned from aircraft developments (and spacecraft) should 
be applied.  In particular, a “best practices” approach to spacecraft handling qualities 
development has been identified and should be adopted.  Two key elements of this best 
practices approach include the following, somewhat non-intuitive concepts: 
1) Deliberately search for handling problems, including the effects of design 
tolerances (parameter uncertainties) and failures. Identify the worst cases and 
any hidden weaknesses in the design, and fully explain any unexpected 
simulation results. 
2) Evaluate the ability of the pilot to enter the control loop, to help out the 
automatic functions.  Show that there is no tendency for divergence between 
the automatic and manual control functions. 
In the unlikely event that handling qualities deficiencies are uncovered, the following 
prioritized recommendations for improving handling qualities are as follows: 
• Fix the problem.  A direct resolution to a handling qualities problem is always 
the most straight-forward and least costly (in terms of life cycle costs).  Since 
changes in a design are dramatically lower the earlier in the design process 
they are uncovered, a vigorous handling qualities “exploration” process is 
critical in the very early stages of a program.  One cannot wait for a “mature” 
design to begin this exploration.  It must be done concurrently wit the design 
process to help the design process and explore the design space, including 
parametric uncertainty and failure conditions.  
• Develop work-around solutions.  Indirect resolutions to handling qualities 
problems – for example, patch-work flight control solutions – can be 
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reasonably effective but they often bring along operational or training 
“baggage” which increase the overall life cycle costs and introduce elements 
of operational risk or operational constraints.  
• Mitigate the problem by operational procedures/changes.  Indirect resolutions 
to handling qualities problems by precluding particular operations to avoid a 
problem area can work but, again, this restricts the operation and additional 
training costs are incurred which increases the overall life cycle costs.  Also, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent inadvertent entry into these problem 
areas and thus, avoid an accident or incident. 
• Improve the Pilot-Vehicle Interface.  Many times a handling qualities problem 
can be improved by providing the pilot with “observability” - the ability to see 
the “problem” - and “controllability” – the ability to acceptably control and 
manage the “problem” and keep it within acceptable performance and 
tolerance.  The best adaptive controller ever made is the human pilot.  Their 
talents can overcome many problems as long as they can see what’s wrong 
and can control it.  Of course, the limitations of human pilots (e.g., fatigue, 
attention, physical strength) must also be considered in this trade-off.  
• Training.  Lastly, the best adaptive controller ever made – the human pilot – 
performs best when properly trained to the problem or trained to adapt to 
unique or changing circumstances near the problem area.  Training should not 
be considered as a “sufficient” solution.  It can also be expensive – since the 
training must have positive transfer and simulation of spacecraft situations can 
be difficult without elaborate facilities on Earth – and simulation is never 
perfect.  Training by simulation is always an approximation.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
A synopsis of experience from the fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft communities in 
handling qualities development and the use of the Cooper-Harper pilot rating scale is 
presented as background for the US spacecraft handling qualities RDT&E.  In addition, 
an overview of handling qualities experiences and lessons-learned from previous US 
spacecraft developments are also reviewed.  These data are not nearly as plentiful as the 
aircraft data (for obvious reasons) but are offered as insight for the future spacecraft 
developments.   
This report is not intended to be a comprehensive, “one-stop” location for all data but 
rather, provides a central location for best practices and important lessons-learned to be 
used as “take-aways” for the future spacecraft developments.  References are given for 
those that desire additional information behind these data.   
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